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1
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     Abstract 
The federal government devotes over a trillion dollars each year to tax provisions that 
pursue “nontax” goals.  Scaling back these tax expenditures should be a high priority.  Yet one-
size-fits-all limits are often proposed, and are not good policy.  Each tax expenditure generates 
its own mix of positive externalities and private benefits (or “programmatic benefits”).  To 
choose the right limit, we should consider what programmatic benefits we would lose.  The goal 
should be to reap programmatic benefits at lower cost.  Different strategies are appropriate for 
each tax expenditure, including: tightening the definition of favored conduct; focusing on 
claimants who are easiest to motivate; favoring claimants who use the subsidy more effectively; 
calibrating how much favored activity we subsidize; and changing the government agency that 
administers the subsidy.  We also should account for excess burden and distribution.  Does 
repeal or a limit influence labor or savings decisions?  Does it affect planning and 
administrative costs?  Does it bring is closer to the distribution we want?   
In addition to proposing this three-part framework for limiting tax expenditures, which 
focuses on programmatic benefits, excess burden, and distribution, this Article also analyzes 
seven different limits.  They have very different effects.  For example, a “cap” eliminates the 
subsidy for high levels of favored activity.  In contrast, a “floor” disallows the subsidy for low 
levels.  “Haircuts,” “maximum fractions,” and “phaseouts” preserve the subsidy for both high 
and low levels of favored activity, but in weakened form.  Each limit offers a different mix of 
strengths and weaknesses, making it a better fit for some tax expenditures than others. 
Like limits, tax expenditures also vary in systematic ways.  This Article identifies an 
important distinction among them.  For some tax expenditures, marginal benefits vary only with 
the activity level of all claimants in the aggregate; for others, marginal benefits also vary with 
the activity level of each claimant.  When we subsidize green energy, for instance, the aggregate 
is our main concern; the goal is to replace as much carbon-based energy as possible, and it 
matters less who is doing so (as long as they do it well enough).  In contrast, when we subsidize 
health insurance, we care a lot about how much insurance each individual has.   The difference 
between what this Article calls “aggregate” subsidies (like green energy) and “individually-
based” subsidies (like health insurance) can influence the type of limit we want.  For example, 
caps are likely to be a better fit for individually-based subsidies than aggregate ones, since we 
care more about how much each claimant claims.   
This Article also makes a number of other recommendations, including: first, the subsidy 
rate often should vary for different tax expenditures; second, instead of using “basket limits” 
that govern a group of tax expenditures, we should tailor a separate limit for each one; and 
third, the subsidy rate often should vary with income.  
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The federal government devotes over a trillion dollars each year to tax provisions that 
pursue “nontax” goals, such as the deduction for mortgage interest and the exclusion for 
employer-provided health insurance.
 2
  Scaling back these “tax expenditures”3 should be a high 
priority, as many commentators and presidential commissions have urged.
4
  Yet too often, the 
same limit is used for a broad range of tax expenditures.  In the 2013 budget deal, for instance, 
Congress revived a uniform limit on itemized deductions called the “Pease rule.”5  In 2012, both 
presidential candidates proposed their own one-size-fits-all limit.
6
  In the same year, the United 
Kingdom imposed a single cap on all personal deductions.
7
  Likewise, the Bowles Simpson 
Commission,
8
 Martin Feldstein,
9
 Edward Kleinbard,
10
 and other distinguished commentators 
                                                          
2
 William McBride, A Brief History of Tax Expenditures, FISCAL FACT, Aug. 22, 2013, at 1, 
http://taxfoundation.org/sites/taxfoundation.org/files/docs/ff391.pdf  (Treasury estimates tax expenditures budget is 
$1.2 trillion, with joint committee at $1.3 trillion, representing 96% growth since 1991); James R. Hines Jr. & Kyle 
D. Logue, Understanding the AMT, and Its Unadopted Sibling, the AMxT, University of Mich. Law & Econ. 
Working Paper No. 78 (Aug. 2013), at 8 n. 27 (describing tax expenditure budget as “readily available (if flawed) 
measure of federal tax preferences”), http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/78/. 
3
 Congress defines tax expenditures as tax provisions that "allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction . . . or 
. . . a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability.”  Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
Control Act of 1974, 2 U.S.C. § 622(3) (2006).  They are “analogous to direct outlay programs, and the two can be 
considered as alternative means of accomplishing similar budget policy objectives."  STAFF OF JOINT COMM. 
ON TAXATION, PUB. NO. JCX-15-11, BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON TAX EXPENDITURE 
ANALYSIS AND HISTORICAL SURVEY OF TAX EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func-startdown&id=3740.  This Article defers to Congress’s definition, 
instead of entering the traditional debate about which provisions are “special” enough to be tax expenditures.  See, 
e.g., Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal Tax Subsidies in the National Budget, 22 NAT. TAX J. 244, 258 (1969).  
The focus here is not on their conceptual compatibility with a particular tax base, but on the welfare effects of 
repealing or limiting them. 
4
 See infra Part I.B.   
5
 Section 68.  All references to specific sections of the Internal Revenue Code in this Article cite to 26 U.S.C. (1986) 
as amended.  See also Frank Armstrong III, Pease Limitation Puts a Lid on Itemized Deductions for 
Wealthy Folks, FORBES, Jan. 9, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2013/01/09/pease-
limitation-puts-a-lid-on-itemized-deductions-for-wealthy-folks/. 
6
 See supra note 4.  
7
 The cap is the greater of 50,000 pounds or 25% of income.  It was introduced in the 2012 budget.  See HM 
Treasury, A Fairer, More Efficient and Simpler Tax System, Mar. 12, 2012, 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130129110402/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/budget2012_fair_efficient_tax.htm 
8
 See, e.g., The National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, The Moment of Truth (2010), 
http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/files/documents/TheMomentofTruth12_1_2010.pdf. 
(using “zero base budgeting” to eliminate all tax expenditures); 
9 Martin Feldstein, Daniel Feenberg, Maya MacGuineas, Capping Individual Tax Expenditure Benefits, NBER 
Working Paper 16921 (April 2011) (advocating overall cap on all itemized deductions, as well as some other tax 
expenditures, so that the tax benefit does not exceed 2% of AGI), http://www.nber.org/papers/w16921.  
10
 EDWARD KLEINBARD, WE ARE BETTER THAN THIS: HOW GOVERNMENT SHOULD SPEND OUR 
MONEY 383 (2014) (proposing to replace all personal itemized deduction with a 15% credit and noting that “[t]he 
reason to curb all the personal itemized deductions is that it is impossible to choose among them.  Each can be 
defended as an incentive for one desirable goal or another”). 
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have all recommended their own version of uniform treatment.
11
  Yet although one-size-fits-all 
answers may be good politics, they are not good policy.  What makes sense for the earned 
income tax credit is unlikely to work for green energy or charity.   
After all, each tax expenditure encourages different behavior, generating its own mix of 
positive externalities and private benefits (or “programmatic benefits”).  In deciding whether to 
scale back a tax expenditure – or, indeed, any government program – we need to consider the 
programmatic benefits we would lose.  If it generates only meager programmatic benefits, we 
have good reason to scale it back.  Even if these benefits are significant, reaping them at lower 
cost is desirable.  This Article canvasses five different strategies for doing so: tightening the 
definition of favored conduct; focusing on claimants who are easiest to motivate; favoring 
claimants who use the subsidy more effectively; calibrating how much favored activity we 
subsidize; and changing the government agency that administers the subsidy.  The right strategy 
depends on the relevant externalities, elasticities, and other context-specific factors.     
In addition to the nontax policy goal, we also need to account for the traditional grist of 
tax policy: excess burden and distribution.  Does repeal or a limit influence labor or savings 
decisions?  Does it affect planning and administrative costs?  For example, most limits can push 
claimants into a higher tax bracket, and some also alter the effective marginal tax rate in other 
ways.  Does repeal or a limit bring us closer to the distribution we want?  Some tax expenditures 
focus especially on low-income people, creating externalities or offering tax benefits that 
disproportionately benefit them.  Yet others do not.  Indeed, since low- and middle-income 
taxpayers are taxed at much lower rates than thirty years ago, many tax expenditures offer them a 
correspondingly reduced tax benefit.
12
  A lot of the relevant effects on excess burden and 
distribution are not unique to tax expenditures, and would arise in scaling back any government 
program (such as the distributional impact of externalities).  Yet some issues arise because these 
measures are in the tax code (such as effects on a claimant’s tax bracket).  Given the broad swath 
of relevant issues, the analysis is too complex and multifaceted for one-size-fits-all answers.  
Instead, this Article offers a three-part framework for limiting tax expenditures, focusing on 
programmatic benefits, excess burden, and distribution.    
This Article also analyzes seven different limits.  Obviously, each one helps the 
government raise more revenue, and also adds complexity to the tax system.  In addition, each 
limit raises the after-tax cost of favored activity, and shifts some claimants to a higher tax 
bracket.  But otherwise, these limits have very different effects.  A “cap” eliminates the subsidy 
for high levels of favored activity.  A “fixed dollar” cap defines this boundary as a specified 
amount (e.g., retirement savings above $15,000 per year), while an “income based” cap defines it 
as a percentage of income (a charitable contributions above 50% of adjusted gross income).  In 
contrast, a “floor” disallows the subsidy for low levels of favored activity.  Again, there are 
fixed-dollar floors (e.g., disallowing charitable contributions below $500) and income-based 
                                                          
11
 Lily Batchelder, Fred T. Goldberg & Peter R. Orszag, Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable 
Tax Credits, 59 STANFORD L. REV. 23 (2006) (arguing that the most efficient default structure for tax expenditures is 
a uniform refundable credit, so that low-income and high-income taxpayers receive the same marginal 
reimbursement rate); Neil Warren, A Politically Viable Strategy for Limiting Personal Income Tax Deductions: The 
Case for a Global Cap, 29 Aus. Tax Forum 357, 359 (2014) (favoring “the UK approach where the focus is on 
global caps rather than imposing specific caps on a myriad of individual itemized deductions”). 
12
 Eric M. Zolt, Inequality in America: Challenges for Tax and Spending Policy, 66 TAX L. REV. 1101 (2013). 
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floors (e.g., disallowing charitable contributions below 1% of adjusted gross income).  Other 
limits preserve the subsidy for both high and low levels of favored activity, but in weakened 
form: a “haircut” disallows a fixed percentage of a deduction or exclusion (e.g., 50% of travel 
and entertainment expenses); a “maximum fraction” limits the tax benefit to a fixed percentage 
(e.g., capping the tax benefit from the charitable deduction to 28%, even for those in higher tax 
brackets); and a “phaseout” reduces the tax benefit for high income claimants.  Just as these 
various limits have diverse effects on programmatic benefits, they also influence excess burden 
and distribution in different ways.  Some limits increase the effective marginal tax rate (e.g., 
phaseouts and income-based floors), while others decrease it (e.g., income-based caps).  Some 
encourage claimants to concentrate favored activity into a single tax year (e.g., floors), and 
others motivate them to spread it across multiple years (e.g., caps).  Some limits especially 
reduce the subsidy for high-income claimants (e.g., phaseouts, fixed-dollar caps, haircuts, and 
maximum fractions), while others do not (e.g., income-based floors, fixed-dollar floors, and 
income-based caps).  As a result, each limit has a different mix of strengths and weaknesses, 
making it a better fit in some contexts than others. 
Like limits, tax expenditures also vary in systematic ways.  This Article identifies an 
important distinction among them.  For some tax expenditures, marginal benefits vary only with 
the activity level of all claimants in the aggregate; for others, marginal benefits also vary with 
the activity level of each claimant.  When we subsidize green energy, for instance, the aggregate 
is our main concern; the goal is to replace as much carbon-based energy as possible, and it 
matters less who is doing so (as long as they do it well enough).  In contrast, when we subsidize 
health insurance, we care a lot about how much insurance each individual has.   The difference 
between what this Article calls “aggregate” subsidies (like green energy) and “individually-
based” subsidies (like health insurance) can influence the type of limit we want.   
For example, caps are likely to be a better fit for individually-based subsidies than 
aggregate ones, since we care more about how much each claimant claims.  In deciding whether 
to impose a cap, we should ask what happens when individual claimants engage in more favored 
activity.  Do the marginal programmatic benefits decline?   If they do, encouraging more activity 
stops being cost effective at a certain point.  For example, what if a basic health insurance policy 
creates positive externalities, but a more expensive “gold plated” one does not add more?  If this 
is the case, we should subsidize only basic policies.  Capping the subsidy saves money while 
preserving programmatic benefits.  A further advantage is that, unlike other limits, a cap does not 
disallow more deductions as claimants earn more.  By not increasing a claimant’s effective 
marginal rate in this way, a cap adds less to excess burden.  A cap also can improve distribution, 
since high-income taxpayers are more likely to buy gold-plated policies.  As long as the marginal 
benefits from health insurance subsidies decline in this way, then, a cap can advance all our 
goals.  But we do not get the same “grand slam” in capping a green energy subsidy, since 
marginal externalities do not decline in the same way.  After all, installing one solar panel on 
every roof is no better than two on every other roof.  Either way, we replace the same amount of 
carbon-based energy. 
While capping health insurance could advance all our goals, it is more typical for 
tradeoffs to arise.  Each limit offers a different mix of tradeoffs, which is a better fit for some 
subsidies than others.  For example, income-based floors involve a tradeoff between 
programmatic benefits and excess burden.  They avoid subsidizing the first dollar of favored 
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activity, which is helpful if the targeted group would engage in this activity anyway.  At the 
same time, though, they increase the claimant’s effective marginal tax rate by disallowing more 
deductions as claimants earn more.  A similar tradeoff arises with phaseouts.  There are 
programmatic advantages in excluding high-income claimants, since they need less help and are 
more likely to engage in the favored activity anyway.  But phaseouts also increase the effective 
tax rate.  Whether a floor or phaseout makes sense in a particular context depends on the 
empirical magnitude of these (and other) competing effects.  The answer varies for different 
subsidies.  For example, a floor is a poor fit when the goal is to persuade claimants to do what 
they are not already doing (e.g., joining the work force), but a good fit when the goal is to 
encourage more of what they are already doing (e.g., charity).   
 Because empirics feature so prominently in this analysis, this Article makes only 
tentative suggestions about individual tax expenditures.  No definitive recommendations are 
offered, since the necessary empirical assessments are beyond this Article’s scope.  Even so, the 
importance of empirics and context has four further implications.  First, the subsidy rate, which 
this Article calls the “marginal reimbursement rate,”13 often should vary for different tax 
expenditures.  Instead of using the marginal tax rate, as we do for deductions and exclusions 
under current law, we should rely on context-specific assessments of externalities and elasticity.  
Second, we should tailor a separate limit for each tax expenditure.  For instance, instead of 
imposing a $25,000 cap on all itemized deductions, as Governor Romney proposed, we should 
use a separate limit for each.  Third, empirical research on these issues has obvious value.  The 
Treasury should consider investing more in this research, as well as sharing more data.  Fourth, 
the marginal reimbursement rate often should vary with income, notwithstanding the contrary 
recommendation of Lily Batchelder, Fred Goldberg, and Peter Orszag.
14
 
 Needless to say, none of this is easy.  Two problems loom especially large in reforming 
tax expenditures.  First, many of the relevant empirical questions are quite difficult to resolve.  
There is only limited empirical work on these issues.  Indeed, there is a great deal of uncertainty 
(and debate) about the magnitude of relevant externalities, elasticities, labor and savings 
distortions, and administrative costs.  The impact of many tax expenditures on distribution is also 
contested.  Yet empirical uncertainty is a perennial challenge in tax policy (and, indeed, in life).  
If we refuse to make policy changes without full information, we (tacitly) commit to the status 
quo.  This is itself a decision based on imperfect information.  Instead, we should do what we 
can with the limited information we have.  While this path is not always satisfying, it is the best 
we can do.   
Second, the political hurdles are quite daunting.  Obviously, each tax expenditure draws 
support from a range of interest groups.  Real estate developers, contractors, and mortgage 
lenders defend the mortgage interest deduction, while religious organizations, universities, and 
museums support the charitable deduction, and so on.  Overcoming this opposition is especially 
difficult in a climate of partisan deadlock.  Even so, any effort to reduce the deficit has to 
disappoint someone.  Compared with the alternatives, limits on tax expenditures have a notable 
political advantage.  Because they are complicated, limits are less salient to voters.
15
  For 
                                                          
13
 This term was coined by Dan Shaviro.  Daniel N. Shaviro, Fixing U.S. International Taxation (2014). 
14
 Batchelder, Goldberg Orszag, supra note 8. 
15
 See Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias in Designing Taxes, 28 YALE J. REG. 253, 296 (2011); Brian 
Galle, Hidden Taxes, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 59 (2009-2010). 
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example, we can increase effective marginal rates not only by raising the stated rate, but also by 
disallowing more deductions as taxpayers earn more.  The Pease rule uses this sort of income-
based floor.  Although economically comparable to a rate increase, the Pease rule is less visible 
to unsophisticated taxpayers.  Limits also can have a further political advantage: if they enhance 
welfare, those who benefit usually become political supporters.  While this support is not always 
sufficient, it can carry the day in some cases.  In any event, political challenges should not keep 
us from considering how to reform tax expenditures.  After all, we need to know where we want 
to go, even if it is hard to get there.   
In developing a three-part framework, analyzing different limits, and identifying 
tradeoffs, this Article focuses more on institutional design than does the public finance literature 
on optimal tax and externalities.
16
  At the same time, this Article offers more general 
observations and prescriptions than does the vast literature on specific tax expenditures, which 
includes work on the employer-provided health insurance exclusion,
17
 mortgage interest 
deduction,
18
 state and local tax deduction,
19
 earned income-tax credit,
20
 charitable deduction,
21
 
Pease Rule,
22
 alternative minimum tax,
23
 Romney cap, and the alternative tax proposed by 
                                                          
16
 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Supply of Public Goods and the Distortionary Cost of Taxation, 49 NAT. 
TAX J. 513 (1996); Louis Kaplow, Optimal Control of Externalities in the Presence of Income Taxation, NBER 
Working Paper 12339 (2006); Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, Integrating Expenditure and Tax Decisions: The 
Marginal Cost of Funds and the Marginal Benefit of Projects, 54 NAT. TAX J. 189 (2001). Agnar Sandmo, Optimal 
Taxation in the Presence of Externalities, 77 SWEDISH J. ECON.86 (1975) (incorporating externalities in an optimal 
tax framework and showing that usual commodity taxes based on elasticity must be coupled with taxes and subsidies 
targeting externalities); Helmuth Cremer, Firouz Gahvari & Norbert Ladoux, Externalities and Optimal Taxation, 70 
J. PUB. ECON. 343 (1998) (noting that optimal mix of Pigouvian and income taxes depends on degree and type of 
information available, so that Sandmo’s additivity principle may not always apply); Emmanuel Saez, The Optimal 
Treatment of Tax Expenditures, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 2657 (2004); Jukka Pirttila and Ronnie Schob, Redistribution and 
Internalization: The Many-Person Ramsey Rule Revisited, 27 PUB. FIN. REV. 541, 554; Yew-Kwang Ng, The 
Optimal Size of Public Spending and the Distortionary Cost of Taxation, 53 NAT. TAX J. 253 (2000) (arguing that 
incentive effects of both the public spending and the accompanying tax must be considered, as well as their net 
distributional effect); Peter Diamond, Optimal Tax Treatment of Private Contributions for Public Goods With and 
Without Warm Glow Preferences, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 897 (2006). 
17
 See, e.g.,  Joseph Bankman, John Cogan, R. Glenn Hubbard & Daniel P. Kessler, Reforming the Tax Preference 
for Employer Health Insurance, 26 TAX POLICY & ECON. 43; Jonathan Gruber, Taxes and Health Insurance, 16 TAX 
POLICY & ECON. 37 (2002). 
18
 See, e.g., Rebecca N. Morrow, Billions of Tax Dollars Spent Inflating the Housing Bubble: How and Why the 
Mortgage Interest Deduction Failed, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. LAW 751 (2012); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The 
Accidental Deduction: A History and Critique of the Tax Subsidy for Mortgage Interest, 73 WTR LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBLS. 233 (2010); Roberta Mann, The (Not So Little) House on the Prairie: The Hidden Costs of the Home 
Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1347 (2000). 
19
 See, e.g., John William Hatfield, Revenue Decentralization, the Local Income Tax Deduction, and the Provision of 
Public Goods, 66 NAT’L. TAX J. 97 (2013). 
20
 See, e.g., Anne Alstott, Why the Earned Income Tax Credit Doesn’t Make Work Pay, 73 LAW & SOC. PROBS. 285 
(2010). 
21
 See, e.g., David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incentives, Information and the Private 
Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 TAX L. REV. 221 (2009) [hereinafter “Subsidizing Charitable Contributions”]; Louis 
Kaplow, A Note on Subsidizing Gifts, 58 J PUB. ECON. 469 (1995). 
22
 Reed Shuldiner & David Shakow, Lessons From the Limitation on Itemized Deductions, TAX NOTES, Oct 29, 
2001, at n.31 & accompanying text (showing that it increases effective marginal rates but does not affect the tax 
savings from the marginal deduction). 
23
 Hines & Logue, supra note 3 (defending alternative minimum tax, while also proposing an alternative maximum 
tax).  Dan Shaviro has also invoked the AMT as evidence of congressional ambivalence about tax expenditures.  
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Warren Buffett,
24
 as well as economic simulations of various proposals.
25
  Some other work also 
operate at this intermediate level of generality.  But this work often comes to different 
conclusions, and considers only a subset of the issues addressed here,
26
 including the effect of 
limits on marginal rates;
27
 the macroeconomic impact of tax expenditures;
28
 the nontax goals of 
tax expenditures;
 29
 fairness;
30
 the nontransparent nature of these limits,
31
 and the advisability of 
uniformity.
32
   
While tax expenditures are a broad topic, they (and other subsidies) are merely a subset 
of the policy instruments available to the government.  For example, instead of subsidizing 
favored behavior, the government can penalize disfavored behavior.  Since these strategies are 
mirror images, the analysis here can be relevant to Pigouvian taxes and other penalties, although 
these connections are not the focus of this Article.
33
  Still another alternative – instead of carrots 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Daniel Shaviro, Perception, Reality and Strategy: The New Alternative Minimum Tax, TAXES 91, 92 (1988) 
(describing enactment of AMT as move from ambivalence to schizophrenia). 
24
 Daniel N. Shaviro, The Bucket and Buffett Approaches to Raising Taxes on High-Income Americans, NYU Law & 
Economics Working Paper 12-44 (2013) (offering brief critique of two specific proposals: the Romney cap and the 
Buffett minimum tax) [hereinafter “Bucket & Buffett”]. 
25
 Eric Toder, Joseph Rosenberg & Amanda Eng, Evaluating Broad-Based Approaches to Limiting Tax 
Expenditures, Tax Policy Center Working Paper, July 8, 2013, 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/412857-Evaluating-Broad-based-Approaches-for-Limiting-Tax-
Expenditures.pdf; Deena Ackerman & Gerald Auten, Floors, Ceilings and Opening the Door for a Non-Itemizer 
Deduction, 59 NAT. TAX J. 509 (2006) (finding that extending charitable deductions to nonitemizers and adding a 
floor, as suggested by President Bush’s 2005 tax reform commission, would lead to greater efficiency and more 
contributions); Michael Schuyler, Feldstein Proposal Increases Federal Revenues But the Devil’s in the Details, 
Apr. 30, 2013, http://taxfoundation.org/article/feldstein-proposal-increases-federal-revenues-devils-details.  
26
 For example, Professors Hines and Logue focus only on the tradeoff between progressivity and the “nontax” 
policies pursued through tax expenditures, without incorporating excess burden into their analysis.  Likewise, in his 
short piece, Professor Shaviro focuses only on the Romney cap and the Buffett alternative tax and does not seek to 
discuss the costs and benefits of various other limits and the tradeoffs they involve. 
27
 Elliott Manning and Laurence Andress show how limits on various tax expenditures influence effective marginal 
rates; but they focus only on excess burden, and not programmatic incentives and distribution.  Elliot Manning & 
Laurence M. Andress, The 1996 Marginal Federal Income Tax Rates: The Image and the Reality, TAX NOTES, Dec. 
30, 1996, at 1585.  Martin Sullivan discusses different ways that caps influence effective marginal rates, but does 
not discuss their effects on programmatic incentives and distribution, or the impact of other limits (such as floors or 
fractions).  Martin A. Sullivan, Deduction Caps Can Raise Marginal Rates, Cut Economic Growth, TAX NOTES, 
Nov. 26, 2012, at 939. 
28
 Yair Listokin, Equity, Efficiency and Stability: the Importance of Macroeconomics for Evaluating Income Tax 
Policy (2012), 29 YALE J. REG. 45 (2012) (analyzing macroeconomic impact of a number of tax expenditures). 
29
 Gregg Polsky proposes to analyze two types of tax expenditures differently in deciding whether to repeal them.  
For distributional tax expenditures (which promote equity), he focuses on fairness; yet for allocative tax 
expenditures (which encourage specific behavior), he focuses on what this Article calls “programmatic incentives.”  
In contrast, this Article argues that both of these issues are relevant for all tax expenditures, as is excess burden, 
which Professor Polsky does not discuss.  His brief article also does not evaluate specific types of limits and the 
tradeoffs they involve.  Gregg D. Polsky, Rationally Cutting Tax Expenditures, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV., 643 
(2011-12). 
30
 Id. (focusing on fairness for what he calls “distributional” tax expenditures). 
31
 See Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias in Designing Taxes, 28 YALE J. REG. 253, 296 (2011); Brian 
Galle, Hidden Taxes, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 59 (2009-2010); Jacob Goldin & Yair Listokin, Tax Expenditure 
Salience, 2012, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2097836. 
32
 Batchelder, Goldberg Orszag, supra note 8. 
33
 Cf. Victor Fleischer, Curb Your Enthusiasm for Pigovian Taxes 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2413066.  
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and sticks – is for the government simply to require the behavior it wants or to prohibit what it 
opposes.  Since regulatory mandates are the subject of a robust literature, and involve a 
somewhat different mix of costs and benefits, they are beyond this Article’s scope. 
 Part I surveys a spate of proposals using one-size-fits-all limits.  Part II develops the 
three-part framework and discusses five strategies for preserving programmatic benefits at lower 
cost.  Part III analyzes seven limits and the different tradeoffs they involve.  Part IV identifies 
two “grand slam” scenarios in which all our goals align.  It also shows how context-specific 
tailoring is needed to balance tradeoffs, and takes issue with Batchelder, Goldberg, and Orszag’s 
view that tax expenditures usually should offer the same reimbursement rate at all income levels.  
Part V is the conclusion. 
I. Revenue, Politics, and a Proliferation of One-Size-Fits-All Proposals  
 
A. A Potentially Significant Source of Revenue 
Repealing or limiting tax expenditures can raise a great deal of revenue.  The federal 
government committed $1.2 trillion to tax expenditures in Fiscal Year 2014,
34
 compared with 
$3.5 trillion of direct spending and $3.03 trillion of taxes collected.
35
  Adjusted for inflation, tax 
expenditures have nearly doubled since 1991.
36
  The largest tax expenditure, the exclusion for 
employer-provided health insurance, was estimated at $143 billion in 2014.
37
  This is more than 
the federal government spent on the Departments of Homeland Security ($39.0 billion), 
Education ($71.2 billion), and Justice ($16.3 billion) combined.
38
  Likewise, the three largest tax 
expenditures supporting home ownership were estimated at $123.8 billion in 2014 ($67.8 billion 
for home mortgage interest, $31.9 billion for property taxes, and $24.1 billion for profits from 
residence).
39
  This rough estimate suggests that health insurance and homeownership together 
($267.5 billion) cost more than the interest on the national debt ($231 billion).
40
  Like direct 
expenditures, tax expenditures support a broad range of activities, including charity ($46.9 
billion),
41
 research and development ($10.2 billion),
42
 green energy ($3.8 billion),
43
 earned 
income ($69.2 billion),
44
 retirement savings ($132 billion),
45
 and education ($33.6 billion).
46
   
                                                          
34
 Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, JCT Identifies 1.2 Trillion of Tax Breaks This Year, Aug. 7, 2014, 
http://crfb.org/blogs/jct-identifies-12-trillion-tax-breaks-year; Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimates of Federal 
Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2014-18, Aug. 5, 2014, [hereinafter “Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates”], 
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4663; see also McBride, supra note 3, at 1 (Treasury 
estimates tax expenditures budget is $1.2 trillion, with joint committee at $1.3 trillion, representing 96% growth 
since 1991).  This sum is only a rough estimate, since tax expenditure estimates do not account for behavioral or 
interaction effects of repeal or limits.  See generally Rosanne Altshuler & Robert Dietz, Reconsidering Tax 
Expenditure Estimation, 64 NAT. TAX J 459, 486  (2011) (“tax expenditures cannot be summed to determine the 
revenue consequences of eliminating sets of preferences due to interaction effects”). 
35
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_United_States_federal_budget.  
36
 McBride, supra note 3, at 1 (representing 96% growth since 1991).   
37
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 31. 
38
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_United_States_federal_budget. 
39
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 25-26. 
40
 Congressional Budget Office, CBO’s Projection of Federal Interest Payments, Nov. 2014, 
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/45684.  
41
Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 29, 31. 
42
 See Appendix, infra. 
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B. Politics and the Proliferation of One-Size-Fits-All Proposals 
Since so much money is at stake, it is not surprising that nonpartisan commissions, 
politicians on both sides of the aisle, and leading academics have proposed to scale back tax 
expenditures in various ways.  Yet advancing this agenda is not easy, since tax expenditures have 
deep political roots.  They offer concentrated benefits to organized interest groups, and are 
subject to less scrutiny than spending programs under congressional rules.
47
  Tax expenditures 
also allow taxpayers to keep money they already have, drawing strength from a cognitive bias 
known as the endowment effect.
48 
 
 
Even so, limiting tax expenditures has four political advantages over other ways to cut 
the deficit.  First, for some voters, limits are less salient than rate increases.
49
  Like the 
alternative minimum tax, their effects can be hard to discern, particularly for less sophisticated 
taxpayers.
50
  Second, this is especially true when politicians promise to impose limits, but do not 
specify which tax expenditures they will target.  While they eventually have to fill in specifics, 
the proposal can gain momentum before then.  Third, scaling back tax expenditures can be 
characterized as either a tax increase or a spending cut.  This hybrid quality gives some “cover” 
to both political parties. Republicans who pledged not to raise taxes can say they kept their 
promise, as can Democrats who promised not to cut social programs.
51
  Fourth, policies that 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
43
 See Appendix, infra. 
44
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 32. 
45
 See Appendix, infra. 
46
 See Appendix, infra.  The appendix offers more detail about these and other examples.  Of over 200 tax 
expenditures identified by the joint committee in 2013, the top five were: Exclusion of health insurance; exclusion 
of pensions; preferential treatment of dividends and capital gains; state and local taxes; and mortgage interest. 
Toder, Rosenberg, Eng, supra, Table 1, at 17 (quoting Joint Committee’s 2013 numbers). 
47
 Edward D. Kleinbard, Tax Expenditure Framework Legislation, 63 NAT. TAX J. 353 (2010). 
48
 Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures and Fiscal Language, 57 TAX L. REV. 187, 220 (2004) 
[hereinafter “Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures”] (“A deeper cause [of the appeal of tax expenditures]  is the 
heuristic bias that decision researchers call the endowment effect, under which people systematically under-weight 
opportunity costs relative to equivalent out-of-pocket costs.”); Weisbach & Nissim, supra, at 970 (“They may 
perceive a tax subsidy as merely letting them keep their money, even while they perceive an identical program that 
taxes them and gives the money back through programs or services to be a subsidy”). 
49
 See Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias in Designing Taxes, 28 YALE J. REG. 253, 310 (2011) 
(arguing that in a “political landscape where there is a looming fiscal crisis but tax aversion and the politics of 
taxation make raising additional revenue extremely difficult,”  Congress should use “low salience provisions that 
make taxation palatable.”). 
50
  As other examples, Professor Schenk mentions the Pease rule, limits on personal exemptions and, more generally, 
limits on tax expenditures. Id. at 277; see also id. (“For example, interaction between various provisions may 
obscure their effects. For instance, the nominal marginal tax rate is quite salient but often it does not apply because 
other provisions, such as income ceilings and phase-outs, have the effect of increasing the rate.”); Manning & 
Andress, supra note 23, at 1614 (“the overall limitation on itemized deductions . . . [was] probably deliberately 
designed to obscure their effect on the [rate] structure and particularly their creation of higher brackets at lower 
amounts of income.”).  
51
 Admittedly, this is the opposite of the traditional view about the bipartisan appeal of tax expenditures articulated 
by Gene Steurle and others, but the political dynamic seems to be changing.  Eugene Steuerle, Tax Policy from 1990 
to 2001, in American Economic Policy in the 1990s 139, 154 (Jeffrey A. Frankel & Peter R. Orszag eds., 2002) 
(“’conservatives’ still hold on to a belief that tax expenditures are reductions in tax and ways of giving money back 
to the people,” Gene Steuerle has observed, “even while ‘liberals’ come to realize that they can achieve certain 
social objectives more easily if enacted as a tax cut.”); see also Eric Toder, Tax Cuts or Spending – Does it Make a 
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make the overall economic pie grow can attract a political following.  Constituents who expect to 
reap these welfare gains can become political allies. The same is true of interest groups who do 
not currently benefit from a tax expenditure, and thus would not be adversely affected by a limit. 
Instead of being indifferent, they will affirmatively support this limit if they expect an alternative 
response to the deficit – such as higher marginal rates, spending cuts, or deficit spending – would 
burden them.
52
   
Yet although there is growing political interest in scaling back tax expenditures, a 
common problem is that proposals often treat all (or almost all) tax expenditures the same way.  
A prominent example is the Bowles Simpson commission of 2010,
53
  which “relies on zero-base 
budgeting by eliminating all income tax expenditures . . . and then using the revenue to lower 
rates and reduce deficits.”54  Commentators and politicians routinely praise the Bowles Simpson 
report,
55
 and rarely focus on its reliance on a uniform approach.   
Likewise, both presidential candidates in 2012 proposed uniform approaches to scaling 
back tax expenditures.  President Obama sought to limit the value of a broad range of tax 
expenditures to 28%.  His proposal applied to all itemized deductions as well as a number of 
exclusions.
56
  Meanwhile, Governor Romney suggested an overall cap on itemized deductions.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Difference? , 53 NAT. TAX J. 361, 361 (“Tax incentives serve the needs of political leaders by enabling them to 
appear to reduce spending and taxes, while at the same time pursuing an activist policy that promotes popular 
programs.”). 
52
 Cf. Siona Listokin, Yair Listokin & Samson Mesel, Americans’ Preferences for Tax Increases and Spending Cuts, 
TAX NOTES, Apr. 8, 2012, at 188 (58% of survey respondents support repeal of state and local tax deduction, while 
53% support repeal of home mortgage interest deduction; in contrast, 84% supported tax increases on “at least 
some” (unspecified) Americans, while 66% supported cuts in (unspecified) nondefense spending, and 64% 
supported cuts in (unspecified) defense programs). 
53
 The National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, The Moment of Truth (2010), 
http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/files/documents/TheMomentofTruth12_1_2010.pdf.  
54
 The National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, supra,  at 29.  In addition to this “zero option,” 
the commission also offers alternative proposals that retain but scale back a few tax expenditures (e.g., offering a 
limited 12% credit for mortgage interest and charity). 
55
 See, e.g., Steven I. Platt, Bring Back Simpson and Bowles, Idaho Bus. Rev., Dec. 3, 2012,  
http://idahobusinessreview.com/2012/12/03/bring-back-simpson-and-bowles/#ixzz3IgSJxv6B  (“Both Simpson and 
Bowles enjoy the almost universal respect and admiration not only of the other members of the commission, but also 
of the president and the leadership of both sides and parties in Congress”); Darrell M. West & Ashley Gabriele, Ten 
Leadership Lessons from Simpson-Bowles, Governance Studies at Brookings, Nov. 2012,  
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2012/11/14%20simpson%20bowles%20west/14%20simp
son%20bowles%20west.pdf (distilling a number of “fiscal leadership lessons” from Simpson-Bowles); 
56
 General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2013 Revenue Proposals 74 (2012), 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2013.pdf (“any tax-exempt 
state and local bond interest, employer-sponsored health insurance paid for by employers or with before-tax 
employee dollars, health insurance costs of self-employed individuals, employee contributions to defined 
contribution retirement plans and individual retirement arrangements, the deduction for income attributable to 
domestic production activities, certain trade and business deductions of employees, moving expenses, contributions 
to health savings accounts and Archer MSAs, interest on education loans, . . . certain higher education expenses, . . . 
[and] itemized deductions after they have been reduced by the statutory limitation on certain itemized deductions for 
higher income taxpayers.”). 
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He originally proposed a $17,000 cap and then increased it to $25,000.
57
  This cap applied to a 
basket of tax expenditures, although the proposal did not specify which were included. 
Similarly, the UK introduced an overall cap on “tax reliefs” in 2012, limiting them to the 
greater of 50,000 pounds or 25% of income.  The stated rationale was “to help ensure that those 
with the highest incomes pay a fairer share.”58  Commentators have urged other jurisdictions to 
follow this model.
59
   
There are obvious political advantages to proposals that apply uniformly to all tax 
expenditures.  They spread the pain more broadly.  Each interest group has less reason to resist if 
it is footing only a fraction of the bill.  Congress also can say that “we are all in this together,” 
casting interest groups that seek special treatment in a less flattering light.
60
  It may also be 
harder for interest groups – or at least for average voters – to predict a limit’s effects when it 
applies to a basket of tax expenditures, instead of a single one.  Likewise, defenders of a global 
limit can say (somewhat disingenuously) that they are not targeting any specific tax expenditure, 
but are merely making sure that taxpayers do not use too many or lower their tax bill too much.
61
 
Yet in addition to politicians, leading academics also have advocated uniform treatment 
of tax expenditures.  Governor Romney’s cap originally comes from Professor Martin Feldstein, 
although Feldstein’s proposal uses a percentage of income to define the cap (2% of adjusted 
gross income), instead of a dollar amount ($17,000 or $25,000).  Also, instead of capping the 
amount that can be deducted or excluded, as Romney does, Feldstein caps the tax benefit that can 
be claimed; under Feldstein’s proposal, then, someone in a higher bracket (who derives more tax 
benefit per dollar) can claim fewer dollars of deductions and exclusions.  Feldstein’s basket cap 
covers a very broad range of tax expenditures.  Earlier versions apply to all itemized deductions, 
the exclusion for employer-provided health insurance, as well as some credits,
62
 while later 
versions exclude the charitable deduction.
63
   
Likewise, in a recent book, Professor Edward Kleinbard advocates recasting all personal 
itemized deductions as 15% credits.  “The reason to curb all the personal itemized deductions,” 
                                                          
57
 See Steven J. Entlin, Analysis of Romney's Tax Plan With and Without a $25,000 Cap on Itemized Deductions, 
The Tax Foundation, http://taxfoundation.org/article/analysis-romneys-tax-plan-and-without-25000-cap-itemized-
deductions. 
58
 HM TREASURY, BUDGET 2012 33 (2012), 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130129110402/http://cdn.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/budget2012_complete.pdf 
59
 See, e.g., Warren, supra, at 359. 
60
 See Feldstein, supra note 7 (”The 2% overall cap on tax expenditures should be politically more acceptable than 
changes in the treatment of mortgage interest or other specific deductions because it treats all tax expenditures 
equally.”); Walter J. Blum, Federal Income Tax Reform—Twenty Questions, 41 TAXES 672, 679 (1963) (“[T]he 
existence of any one special dispensation makes it easier to argue on behalf of others. . . . [A] Spartan attitude 
toward defending the integrity of the base will aid in creating the impression that the reform plan is intended to 
improve the system as a whole, with the chips falling as they may, and is not calculated to benefit certain 
identifiable groups possessing political strength.”). 
61
 Warren, supra, at 376 (arguing that global caps “elicit far less strident criticism as they do not target one particular 
group but all taxpayers whose total deductions increase with increasing income”). 
62
 Martin Feldstein, Daniel Feenberg, Maya MacGuineas, Capping Individual Tax Expenditure Benefits, NBER 
Working Paper No. 16921 (April 2011). 
63
 See Feldstein, supra note 7 (“The existing charitable deduction in particular deserves to be maintained.”) 
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he argues, “is that it is impossible to choose among them.  Each can be defended as an incentive 
for one desirable goal or another.”64  Echoing this theme, Professor Neil Warren advocates “the 
UK approach where the focus is on global caps rather than imposing specific caps on a myriad of 
individual itemized deductions.”65 
Similarly, tax expenditures are treated uniformly in a prominent proposal by Lily 
Batchelder, Fred Goldberg, and Peter Orszag.  Their focus is not on how to limit tax 
expenditures, but how to structure them.  They want each tax expenditure to be a refundable 
credit (so that it is available even to those who would not otherwise owe tax), instead of a 
deduction or exclusion.  This way, all taxpayers receive the same marginal reimbursement rate, 
whether they have low or high incomes.  To be clear, their goal is uniformity among taxpayers, 
not among tax expenditures (so they are not arguing that all tax expenditure should have the 
same marginal reimbursement rate).  Rather, they offer an efficiency-based argument that 
uniform treatment of all taxpayers should be the default.
66
     
  
II. Three-Part Framework: Programmatic Benefits, Excess Burden, and 
Distribution 
Notwithstanding their political advantages, one-size-fits-all approaches are not good 
policy.  Rather, in deciding whether to scale back a tax expenditure, we should use context-
specific cost-benefit analysis.  As Joel Slemrod and Shlomo Yitzhaki have shown, we should 
consider how welfare costs and benefits change at the margin.
67
     
A. A Context-Specific Framework  
This Part offers a three-part framework for these judgments.  We should begin with the 
programmatic benefits we lose.  For example, if the exclusion for employer-provided health 
insurance is scaled back, will people be less healthy?  Likewise, if a tax expenditure has negative 
effects, repealing or limiting it could reduce these programmatic costs.  The balance is different 
for each tax expenditure.  Section B explores these issues.   
Second, how does scaling back a tax expenditure affect excess burden?
68
  For tax 
expenditures that add more to deadweight loss, repeal or a limit is especially appealing.  Yet if 
repeal or the limit itself creates deadweight loss, the case becomes weaker. Again, there is no 
one-size-fits all answer. Section C considers these questions. 
                                                          
64
 KLEINBARD, supra, at 383. 
65
 Warren, supra, at 359. 
66
 Batchelder, Goldberg & Orszag, supra note 8, at 24. 
67
 See Slemrod & Yitzhaki, Integrating Expenditure and Tax Decisions, supra note 12. 
68
 Models in this literature typically use optimal taxation, supplemented by commodity taxes that pursue 
redistribution or correct for externalities.   See, e.g., Agnar Sandmo, Optimal Taxation in the Presence of 
Externalities, 77 SWEDISH J. ECON.86 (1975) (incorporating externalities in an optimal tax framework and showing 
that usual commodity taxes based on elasticity must be coupled with taxes and subsidies targeting externalities); 
Jukka Pirttila and Ronnie Schob, Redistribution and Internalization: The Many-Person Ramsey Rule Revisited, 27 
PUB. FIN. REV. 541, 554 (1999) (“the modified many-person Ramsey tax rule reveals that the influence of 
commodity taxation on the demand for taxed goods depends on both redistributional and environmental 
objectives.”).   
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 A third important factor is distribution.  If a tax expenditure particularly benefits low-
income taxpayers, scaling it back is less appealing.  Likewise, we should be more wary of 
administrative and programmatic costs that burden these taxpayers.   How much we favor low-
income taxpayers depends on our social welfare function.  Whether a limit disproportionately 
affects them depends on the context.  For example, the earned income tax credit and mortgage 
interest deduction have different distributional impact, so limiting them in the same way has 
different welfare effects.  Section D analyzes these issues.
69
 
This framework focuses on what we lose in repealing or limiting a tax expenditure.  The 
offsetting benefit, of course, is that the government saves money.  To know how much this 
savings enhances welfare, we need to know how it will be used.
70
  Will we cut taxes?  Will we 
avoid raising them?  Will we cut the deficit?  Or fund a new initiative? The case for repeal or 
limits is stronger if we use the savings wisely.
71
  But this a separate issue, which is beyond this 
Article’s scope.  Before we determine the best way to use savings, we first need to generate it – 
ideally, at the lowest possible (welfare) cost.   
Although the rest of this Part discusses programmatic benefits, excess burden and 
distribution separately, analyzing only one without the others does not yield a conclusive 
assessment.  While examples are offered at various points to clarify the analysis, they are merely 
illustrative, and are not meant as definitive recommendations.  Such a thorough analysis would 
require fact-specific inquiries that are beyond this Article’s scope.  Instead, the goal here is to 
clarify the relevant questions, identify tradeoffs and patterns, and develop more general lessons.    
B. What Programmatic Benefits Do We Lose in Repealing or Limiting a Tax 
Expenditure? 
                                                          
69
 Excess burden and distribution need not be considered, as Louis Kaplow has shown, if the government can tell 
what benefit each individual derives from a program and charges each taxpayer this amount.  This benefits tax 
involves no redistribution or behavioral distortions, since people are simply paying for value.  Louis Kaplow, The 
Optimal Supply of Public Goods and the Distortionary Cost of Taxation, 49 NAT. TAX J. 513, 514 (when “any 
reduction in disposable income due to the tax adjustment is balanced by the benefit from the public good,” work 
effort and utility level are unaffected and “the simple cost-benefit formula indicates whether the public good should 
be supplied”); Louis Kaplow, Optimal Control of Externalities in the Presence of Income Taxation, NBER Working 
Paper 12339 (2006) (formalizing this result).  But if the program is financed with a tax that involves redistribution 
and behavioral distortions, as is generally the case, these additional factors must be considered. 
70
 Indeed, it could be that the same limit is cost-justified if the savings is used one way, but not another.  Cf. Slemrod 
and Yitzhaki, supra (when tax and transfer policy is not set optimally, decision about whether to add a new 
government program depends on how it will be funded; answer can change if one funding source is used instead of 
another ); see also, e.g., Michael Schuyler, The Effect of Terminating Tax Expenditures and Cutting Individual Tax 
Rates, Sept. 30, 2013, [hereinafter “Terminating Tax Expenditures and Cutting Individual Tax Rates”], 
http://taxfoundation.org/article/effects-terminating-tax-expenditures-and-cutting-individual-income-tax-rates (using 
Tax Foundation’s taxes and growth model to simulate effects of cutting various tax expenditures with and without 
rate cuts; simulations suggest that rate cuts are needed to counteract potentially significant adverse effects on 
growth). 
71
 Of course, if tax and spending policies were optimal, then this would not be the case.  As Slemrod and Yitzhaki 
have observed, the marginal benefit from all public projects and the marginal cost of public funds would all be the 
same.  Otherwise, we would replace low-benefit projects with higher benefit ones, and we would replace higher-cost 
funding sources with lower-cost ones, until all were equal at the margin.  Slemrod and Yitzhaki, supra note 12, at 
191-96.  Yet only the staunchest optimist would suggest that current tax and spending policies are anything close to 
optimal. 
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This Section considers the programmatic benefits we lose when scaling back a tax 
expenditure.  We want to keep as much as possible, even as we cut costs.  The goal, then, is to 
extract more programmatic benefits per subsidy dollar – that is, “more bang for the buck.” 
1. Externalities, Private Benefits, and Incidence 
The priority should be to preserve positive externalities (as opposed to private benefits), 
since otherwise these benefits to third parties would be undersupplied.  At the margin, a subsidy 
usually should equal the marginal positive externalities it creates (net of any marginal negative 
externalities).
72
  By contrast, the market usually provides private benefits without a subsidy.  For 
example, we don’t need to subsidize mortgage interest to ensure that wealthy people live in 
houses they like.  However, some private benefits are worth subsidizing for distributional 
reasons.  An important justification for the earned income tax credit (“EITC”), for instance, is the 
private benefits it offers to low-income taxpayers.   
In assessing the value of externalities and private benefits, we need to account for 
economic incidence.  For example, if the EITC enables employers to reduce wages, the real 
beneficiary is the employer instead of the employee.  Likewise, a subsidy for health insurance 
might drive up the cost of care, benefiting health care providers more than policyholders.  
Obviously, we need to know who is really benefitting in order to determine how valuable a 
subsidy is.    
2. Three Possibilities: Repeal, Status Quo, or Tightening Strategies 
 A tax expenditure (or, indeed, any government program) that is counterproductive 
obviously is a promising candidate for repeal.  For instance, cigarette companies used to argue 
that cigarettes – or at least some brands – were good for a smoker’s health.73  If a subsidy had 
been enacted to encourage better health through smoking, the right response obviously would be 
to repeal it.   
The same is true of a tax expenditure that offers only meager programmatic benefits.  For 
example, if a tax expenditure enables the government to endorse a particular activity, but fails to 
induce more of it, the government should look for cheaper ways to make a symbolic statement.    
In contrast, it is costly to scale back a tax expenditure that produces substantial positive 
externalities.  For instance, accelerated depreciation and other investment incentives arguably 
promote economic growth more effectively than marginal rate cuts (and, in fact, would not be 
                                                          
72
 Louis Kaplow, On the (Ir)relevance of Distribution and Labor Supply Distortion to Government Policy, 18 J. 
ECON. PERSP. Fall 2004, at 160-64 (optimal subsidy equates marginal social benefit of activity with marginal social 
cost).  It also can be lower if these externalities correlate with leisure, and higher if they correlate with another 
(unsubsidized) externality.  This is equivalent to offsetting the subsidy with a commodity tax.  Saez, supra note 12; 
Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Supply of Public Goods and the Distortionary Cost of Taxation, 49 NAT. TAX J. 513, 
518 (1996); Louis Kaplow, Optimal Control of Externalities in the Presence of Income Taxation 11, 15, 18 (NBER 
Working Paper No. 12339, 2006)         
73
 Leah Lawrence, Cigarettes Were Once ‘Physician’ Tested, Approved, HEALIO, Mar. 10, 2009, 
http://www.healio.com/hematology-oncology/news/print/hemonc-today/%7B241d62a7-fe6e-4c5b-9fed-
a33cc6e4bd7c%7D/cigarettes-were-once-physician-tested-approved.  
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classified as “tax expenditures” under a consumption tax baseline). 74  Robust programmatic 
benefits can supply a powerful reason to keep a tax expenditure, although we also should account 
for excess burden and distribution.   
 Yet even if a tax expenditure (or any government program) is worth preserving, we 
should try to attain all (or most) of its programmatic benefits at lower budgetary cost.  The rest of 
this Part identifies five ways to do so: first, defining the funded activity more precisely; second, 
identifying more responsive claimants; third, favoring claimants who will make more effective 
use of the subsidy; fourth, calibrating how much activity we should fund, both for each claimant 
and overall; fifth, housing the program in a part of the government that can implement it most 
effectively.  In choosing a strategy, we have to account for the factual context, as well as excess 
burden and distribution.   What works for one tax expenditure may not work for another.  
3. Which Activity Do We Want to Encourage?: Definitional Strategies 
A familiar way to “tighten up” a tax expenditure is to define the funded activity more 
precisely.  A clearer and more focused signal presumably is more likely to motivate the behavior 
we want.  There is value, then, in explicitly excluding low-value activities.  For example, 
education credits exclude “education involving sports, games, or hobbies” as well as 
nonacademic fees.
75
   The reason presumably is that these expenses add less to human capital 
than academic tuition, and also are not easy to distinguish from leisure. 
Yet precision is helpful only if it actually distinguishes high- and low-value activities, 
and this is not always the case.  For example, detailed rules specify what qualifies as a deductible 
medical expense, but the answers sometimes seem arbitrary: removing lead paint is deductible, 
but covering it with wallpaper is not; breast pumps are deductible, while maternity clothes are 
not, and so on.
76
        
Precise definitions also can be costly to formulate and administer.  Sometimes these costs 
are justified, but sometimes they are not.  For example, the charitable deduction arguably should 
cover for-profit charity, as well as gifts to family and friends, since these activities can generate 
positive externalities.  Yet a key problem with subsidizing them, as Professor Kaplow has 
observed, is the challenge of distinguishing them from standard commercial arrangements.
77
   
                                                          
74
 For example, a widely cited study claims that repealing accelerated depreciation and other investment incentives 
to fund reductions in the corporate tax rate would slow growth.  See John W. Diamond, Thomas S. Neubig & 
George R. Zodrow, The Dynamic Economic Effects of a U.S. Corporate Income Tax Rate Reduction (June 17, 2011) 
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In some cases, the government does not have the substantive expertise or political 
independence to develop precise funding parameters.  For these reasons, the R&D credit is 
imprecise by design.  The government is not well positioned to determine which technologies are 
most promising.  Instead, the R&D credit uses expansive criteria, such as requiring projects to be 
“technological in nature,” and “useful in the development of a new or improved business 
component.”78  The charitable deduction is similarly broad and vague.  Its nondirective approach 
promotes experimentation, enabling the government to fund causes that would not (yet) be 
supported by the median voter.  As a result, the civil rights movement, environmentalism, and 
the women’s rights movement all were launched with deductible charitable contributions.79  At 
the same time, a nondirective approach also creates the risk that undeserving activities will be 
funded.   The optimal balance between promoting experimentation and reducing waste will vary 
for each tax expenditure, and excess burden and distribution must also be considered.  Again, 
there is no one-size-fits-all answer.   
4. Which Claimants are Easiest to Motivate?: Elasticity Strategies 
 Once the favored conduct has been defined, a key question is how much the government 
must pay to induce more of it.  Obviously, less is better.  Another familiar strategy, then, is to 
favor claimants who are relatively open to the favored conduct, and thus respond to a leaner 
subsidy.
 80s
  “By targeting the subsidy to those whose tastes for the favored commodity are 
relatively intense,” Alan Blinder and Harvey Rosen have observed, a subsidy “does not `waste’ 
money on those whose consumption is not stimulated very much.”81   
The amount needed to change behavior will vary with the person, as well as the tax 
expenditure.  Sometimes tastes and philosophical commitments are relevant.  For instance, it 
probably is easier to persuade a committed environmentalist to buy solar panels. 
Typically, high-income taxpayers are easier to influence, since they have more capacity 
in their budgets.  For example, if we want someone to commit $25,000 to solar panels or a fuel 
efficient car, a potential claimant earning $2.5 million is easier to persuade than one earning 
$50,000.  In response, we can structure the subsidy so it declines with income, or we can set it at 
the (leaner) level that is appropriate for high-income claimants.  Likewise, limiting the subsidy to 
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itemizers tends to channel it to high-income claimants.  Of course, distribution or excess burden 
sometimes counsels against this approach, and should be weighted in the balance. 
 Although claimants should be responsive, they should not be too responsive.  We should 
not pay for what taxpayers would do anyway, a form of waste sometimes called “buying the 
base.”82  For example, subsidizing the first dollar of charity is wasteful if everyone would give 
this amount without a subsidy.
83
  In response, we can disallow charitable contributions below a 
floor.  In other work, I have suggested a charitable credit that becomes more generous as 
taxpayers give a higher percentage of their income to charity.
84
  Likewise, President Bush’s 2005 
tax reform panel proposed to subsidize charity only above 1% of income.
85
  Yet a familiar 
challenge is that preferences vary.  For example, although many Americans give at least 1% of 
their income to charity – and some receive no subsidy, since they claim the standard deduction – 
a 1% floor would still be too high for some and too low for others.
86
  Some will stop giving, 
some will receive an infra-marginal subsidy, and some will reduce their contribution to offset the 
subsidy they lost through the floor.
87
  These competing effects should all be considered in 
deciding whether, and where, to set a floor (along with excess burden and distribution). 
5. Which Claimants Will Make Most Effective Use of the Subsidy? 
Comparative-Advantage Strategies 
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A third approach is to favor claimants who make the most effective use of a subsidy.  In 
some circumstances, claimants are fungible.  For instance, assume we want to subsidize 
carpooling to reduce negative externalities from traffic, such as delays, noise, and accidents.  We 
are unlikely to care which commuters claim this subsidy, as long as enough do.     
In contrast, factors such as expertise, infrastructure or even weather sometimes give 
claimants a comparative advantage.  For example, if our goal is to encourage technological 
innovation, engineers have an edge over literary critics and musicians.  Similarly, some 
charitable donors make wiser philanthropic decisions than others.  Alternatively, assume our goal 
is to reduce fuel consumption as a way to enhance national security (by reducing imports from 
unstable or hostile countries).  If we subsidize mass transit, residents of Manhattan (which has 
extensive mass transit) can use the subsidy more effectively than residents of rural Kansas 
(which does not).  Likewise, subsidizing weather stripping to conserve fuel in heating homes is 
more effective in frigid Chicago than in mild Los Angeles..   
For some tax expenditures, financial need is a source of comparative advantage.  Private 
benefits to low income claimants add more to welfare, given diminishing marginal utility.  In 
addition to distribution, there also is an externalities-based reason.  If a community is committed 
to supporting anyone who is not self-sufficient, the community saves money when people 
become self-sufficient.  Someone who enters the workforce no longer relies on the community 
for support.  The same is true when he funds his own health care, housing, and retirement 
savings.  By inducing people to take these steps, a subsidy can generate what this Article calls 
“self-sufficiency externalities.”  Low-income claimants are especially likely to generate these 
externalities, since they are at greater risk of depending on the community.
88
   
In promoting self-sufficiency externalities, we target those who (by definition) would not 
otherwise engage in the favored conduct (e.g., working or saving for retirement).  If we are 
successful, the good news is that we are less likely to pay for what claimants would do anyway.  
The other side of this coin, though, is that these claimants are (by definition) resistant, rather than 
responsive.  As a result, they are harder (and more expensive) to motivate.  For these subsidies, 
greater welfare gains come at greater cost. 
But fortunately, this tradeoff between comparative advantage and elasticity does not 
always arise.  In other contexts, taxpayers who make the most effective use of a subsidy are also 
the most responsive.  For example, the same reason Chicagoans use weather stripping more 
effectively than Angelenos – the cold weather – also makes them want it more.  As a result, 
Chicagoans require less persuasion to buy it.  The same is true of mass transit subsidies.  Since 
Manhattan residents actually can use this subsidy, they will be more responsive.  Likewise, it 
will be easier to persuade an engineer than a literary critic to engage in R&D.  Since claimants 
would have to invest time and resources, they are more likely to do so if they expect a return.      
Thus, while we have a uniform goal with each subsidy – to favor claimants who generate 
the most welfare per subsidy dollar – we should pursue this goal differently for each tax 
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expenditure.  If a claimant’s comparative advantage derives from financial need, an income-
based test may be the right mechanism.  Yet if comparative advantage is rooted instead in a 
claimant’s effectiveness in engaging in the favored conduct – given their preferences, location, 
expertise, etc. – other approaches will be preferable.  In some cases, we should sort claimants 
with a competitive process, as when developers apply to state housing agencies for the low-
income housing credit.  In other cases, substantive conditions can be introduced, for instance, so 
weather-stripping is subsidized only in cold climates.  We also can winnow with price.  By 
keeping the subsidy low, the government allocates it to taxpayers who are most willing to put up 
their own money, such as researchers who are especially confident about R&D or philanthropists 
who are particularly committed to a cause.  The right strategy varies with the factual context and, 
of course, must also account for excess burden and distribution. 
6. How Much Favored Activity Do We Want? Activity-Level Strategies  
 In addition to defining the favored activity carefully and identifying the right claimants, 
we also need to calibrate the amount of activity we want to subsidize.  Another tightening 
strategy, then, is to focus on how much funded activity we want overall and, in some cases, how 
much we want per claimant.  
For any tax expenditure, there are likely to be diminishing returns when we encourage 
more favored activity in the aggregate.  Once we have funded all the high value projects (e.g., 
solar panels in sunny locations), the remaining low-value projects (e.g., cloudy locations) offer 
less bang for the buck.  In response, Congress can cap its overall annual spending on a tax 
expenditure.  Although common for direct expenditures, a fixed appropriation is rare for tax 
expenditures.  Congress does use one, though, for the low income housing credit. 
a. Individually-Based Tax Expenditures Versus Aggregate Tax Expenditures  
Marginal returns can vary not only with the overall activity level, but also with the 
activity level of each claimant.   These variations are crucial for some tax expenditures, and 
minor for others.  Distinguishing these two types of tax expenditure is a contribution of this 
Article.  This difference affects the type of limit we should use.        
Sometimes the activity level of each claimant is quite important.  For instance, assume 
our goal in subsidizing retirement savings is to keep retirees from becoming a burden on the 
community.  With this goal, subsidizing someone who otherwise would save only $100 
generates more positive externalities than someone who would save $1,000,000 without a 
subsidy.  When we are promoting self-sufficiency, then, marginal positive externalities decline 
as an individual engages in more of the favored activity. 
 In contrast, sometimes only the aggregate activity level is relevant, while the per-person 
level is not.  In these cases, once we identify the right pool of potential claimants, we can rely on 
a blunt allocation to this group, without worrying about how much each individual claims.  
Subsidized solar panels are an example.  If the goal is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, we 
want panels to be installed in sunny locations.  But once we do that, it does not matter whether 
we subsidize one panel on each house, or two on every other house.  Either way, we are 
replacing carbon-based energy.  On a claimant-by-claimant basis, marginal positive externalities 
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from solar panels do not decline in the same way (although they can decline as activity levels 
rise in the aggregate).   
This Article uses the phrase “aggregate tax expenditure” to describe the solar panel 
example, as well as other tax expenditures whose marginal programmatic benefits vary primarily 
with aggregate activity levels.  In contrast, this Article uses the phrase ”individually-based  tax 
expenditure” to describe the retirement example, as well as other tax expenditures whose 
marginal programmatic benefits also vary substantially with individual activity levels.  
 Different limits are appropriate for these two categories.  If our goal is to encourage 
enough retirement savings so that people are self-sufficient, we should cap the amount of each 
claimant’s subsidized savings.  This sort of cap focuses the subsidy on high-value uses (i.e., the 
minimum needed for self-sufficiency).  In contrast, setting a cap of, say, one solar panel per 
claimant does not offer the same advantage (although there could be other rationales for such a 
limit, grounded in budgetary impact, excess burden, or distribution.)       
b. Examples of  Individually-Based Tax Expenditures 
 The defining feature of an individually-based tax expenditure, then, is that programmatic 
benefits vary as individual activity levels change.  There are several reasons why this can be the 
case. The first is that marginal positive externalities can decline.  This is true of subsidies that 
encourage self-sufficiency, such as subsidized retirement savings and the EITC.  After all, it 
makes sense to subsidize an extra dollar of earnings when someone’s annual pay is $10,000, but 
not $200,000.  (Obviously, there is a distributional rationale as well, as noted above.)
89
  A similar 
analysis applies to education credits.  If the goal is to encourage the minimum human capital 
people need to support themselves, marginal programmatic benefits decline in a similar way.  If 
so, per-claimant caps on these tax expenditures are likely to enhance their “bang for the buck” 
(although we also have to consider excess burden and distribution). 
Second, even if positive externalities remain constant (or increase) as the subsidy 
becomes more generous, there can still be a net marginal decline if programmatic costs increase 
(more).  This is true of tax-free fringe benefits.  To avoid administrative costs, employees are not 
taxed on occasional free meals, modest employee discounts, and the like.  Yet this administrative 
savings comes at a price.  Fringe benefits distort compensation practices, since their tax 
treatment is more favorable than cash. Because some industries can offer them more easily than 
others, their labor costs are lower.  These distortions become more serious as fringe benefits 
become more valuable.  As the subsidy per claimant increases in this way, programmatic costs 
come to outweigh the administrative savings. This shifting balance suggests that tax free 
treatment should be limited to low-value fringe benefits, as generally is the case under current 
law.     
The analysis is similar for subsidized health insurance.  A subsidy for basic policies is 
sufficient to generate most of the positive externalities we want, while a subsidy for “gold 
plated” policies introduces new problems.  After all, basic policies keep people from depending 
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on the community for health care.  They also broaden the insurance pool, so risk is spread more 
effectively.  In addition, basic policies ordinarily prevent people from infecting others and enable 
them to discharge responsibilities to coworkers, family, other drivers on the road, etc.  So what 
changes if we also subsidize “gold-plated” policies?  There could be more funding for medical 
research, which generates positive externalities.  Yet there also would be private benefits, such as 
more convenient health care without long waits, which do not justify a subsidy.  In addition, we 
might encourage overspending and drive up health care costs (e.g., if deductibles and 
copayments are lower), thereby generating negative externalities.
90
  It is plausible, then, that 
increasing the subsidy per claimant causes marginal programmatic benefits to decline on a net 
basis (e.g., if the effect on costs outweighs the effect on research).  If so, a per-claimant cap 
increases this tax expenditure’s bang for the buck (although, again, we also have to account for 
excess burden and distribution).
91
   
Likewise, subsidized home ownership also involves increasing programmatic costs.  The 
purchase of a more expensive home can inspire envy or pressure others to spend more so they 
“keep up with the Joneses.”92  There are also negative externalities if homeowners are less able 
to move for a new job, which could be more daunting with more expensive houses.  On the other 
side of the ledger, there are positive externalities if homeowners are more committed than renters 
to improving neighborhoods,
93
 and if a homeowner’s investment enhances the value of her 
neighbors’ homes.  It seems plausible that the balance of these competing effects becomes less 
favorable as the subsidy per claimant increases.  If so, an individually-based cap increases the 
subsidy’s bang for the buck (although excess burden and distribution also must be considered). 
Finally, although the focus so far has been on marginal programmatic benefits that 
decline, they also can increase as a claimant engages in more favored activity.  For example, if 
the goal is to create a public park, it is more helpful for one person to donate a two-acre plot than 
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for twenty people to donate unconnected one-tenth-of-an-acre plots.  In addition, charitable 
donors who give large gifts have a greater ability to monitor nonprofits, since they have added 
influence and also more at stake.  When there are scale economies in generating positive 
externalities, caps can be counterproductive (although excess burden and distribution also must 
be taken into account). 
Given these various context-specific effects, there is no reason to expect the same limit to 
be a good fit for each tax expenditure.  Yet for individualized tax expenditures, if (net) 
externalities decline as taxpayers engage in more activity, capping the amount each claimant can 
claim can save money while preserving (most) programmatic benefits. 
c. Examples of Aggregate Tax Expenditures 
 The analysis is quite different, though, for tax expenditures that seek to influence 
aggregate, rather than individual, activity levels.  Calibrating how much each claimant receives is 
less important (and, indeed, can be unhelpful) in three situations.  In the first, it does not matter 
which claimant engages in the favored conduct, as long as enough do.  In the carpooling example 
above, a subsidy reduces negative externalities from traffic as long as a sufficient number of 
drivers share rides, but we do not care which do.  Congestion, noise, and the risk of accidents are 
reduced as much when one commuter carpools all of the time as when two commuters carpool 
half of the time.  There is no obvious rationale, then, to limit how much carpooling each claimant 
is encouraged to do.
94
     
 Second, in some cases claimants are not fungible – so we have to ensure they are part of 
the group that uses the subsidy effectively – but the allocation within this group is less important.  
For instance, we can reduce greenhouse gases more by installing solar panels in sunny climates, 
as noted above.  But once we impose that constraint, it does not matter whether there is one on 
every house or two on every other house.  In fact, a weather-related requirement may be 
unnecessary, since residents of sunny climates are the most likely buyers anyway, as noted 
above.  Instead, requiring a claimant to bear some of the cost (a “matching mechanism”) may be 
sufficient.  We can offer the lowest subsidy needed to induce enough claimants to install solar 
panels, knowing that environmentalists and wealthier households (all in sunny climates) are most 
likely to claim it.  Of course, excess burden and distribution could affect this assessment as well.   
The analysis is similar when we want to reduce energy imports for national security 
reasons.  Weather stripping advances this goal more effectively in cold climates, as noted above.  
Within this parameter, though, a subsidy can save the same amount of energy on Michigan 
Avenue as on the South Side of Chicago.  If so, the most cost effective way to generate these 
programmatic benefits is to subsidize the more responsive claimant.  Indeed, if the Michigan 
Avenue family is more responsive – and they also have a ski cabin in Colorado – a second 
subsidy for them could make sense (again, setting aside excess burden and distribution).  The 
analysis is similar for a subsidy that reduces energy imports by promoting fuel-efficient vehicles.   
Third, in other cases it does matter who engages in the subsidized conduct, but the 
government is not well positioned to screen claimants.  For example, we are not indifferent about 
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who claims the R&D subsidy, since some are more likely to engage in promising research.  But 
as noted above, the government may lack the expertise (and political independence) to choose 
technological winners.  Likewise, the charitable subsidy is supposed to promote experiments that 
the median voter would not (yet) fund; by definition, a politically accountable institution is not 
well suited to implement this strategy.  Instead of relying on the government to choose among 
competing proposals, then, these tax expenditures use vague language (e.g., “technological in 
nature”) or rough proxies (e.g., the nonprofit form) to create a broad class of potentially eligible 
claimants.  Further winnowing is accomplished with a matching mechanism.  If we are 
reasonably confident in this allocation method, we can treat R&D and charity as more like 
aggregate than individualized tax expenditures.  After all, the goal is not to ensure that every 
taxpayer engages in a minimum level of research and philanthropy, but to encourage more of this 
conduct overall at the lowest possible cost.  Unlike with the EITC or subsidized health insurance, 
then, there is no obvious reason why marginal programmatic benefits decline as individual 
activity levels increase.    
This third category of aggregate tax expenditures, which is premised on the government’s 
inability to allocate the funding effectively, is perhaps the most contestable.  Admittedly, we 
might still want a per-claimant cap if we are skeptical about these passive allocations, since a cap 
can limit losses from misguided projects.
95
  Or we might want to limit the private benefits that 
claimants receive, such as prestige or personal satisfaction from giving to charity.
96
  
Alternatively, in the case of the charitable deduction, we might favor a cap so taxpayers have to 
participate, at least to a degree, in funding publicly-determined priorities; presumably, this 
communitarian notion underlies current law’s cap on the charitable deduction.97  Yet these 
rationales for a cap are different from those for individualized subsidies: instead of seeking more 
bang for the buck, they minimize risk or limit harm to other values.  In any event, even if we 
don’t want a per-claimant cap, we may want a per-claimant floor.  If most businesses engage in 
some R&D and most taxpayers give at least some charity anyway, subsidizing the first dollar is 
wasteful, as noted above.  In making these judgments, we also have to consider excess burden 
and distribution. 
While this Article distinguishes between aggregate and individualized tax expenditures, 
the difference is more of a spectrum than a dichotomy.  Some tax expenditures have elements of 
both.  As a result, how we classify a tax expenditure – and, more importantly, how we limit it – 
depends on our policy priority.  For example, while an education subsidy can create positive 
externalities in funding a basic education that leads to self-sufficiency, as noted above, it also 
can create positive externalities in funding an advanced education that leads to scientific 
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4 n. 15.  However, if there is no systematic difference between small and large gifts, the aggregate approach is 
better.  The same obviously is true if large donors make better decisions, for instance, if they invest more time and 
thought or provide useful monitoring.  Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions, supra note 17.   
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problematic.  In any event, the assumption that warm glow contributes to welfare is a contested point.  Peter 
Diamond, Optimal Tax Treatment for Private Contributions for Public Goods With and Without Warm Glow 
Preferences, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 897, 909, 916 (2004) (arguing that warm glow might not add to social welfare). 
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 Individuals may not claim a charitable deduction equal to more 30% or 50% of their AGI.  For a critique of this 
limit, see Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions, supra note 17. 
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research, public service, or entrepreneurship.
98
  Similarly, a retirement savings subsidy can 
generate positive externalities in promoting not only self-sufficiency, but also capital formation, 
which contributes to economic growth.  In each case, a subsidy pursuing the first goal (self-
sufficiency) generates externalities in encouraging a minimum level per claimant of education or 
savings, but not more; yet a subsidy pursuing the second goal (human capital or capital 
formation) also generates externalities at higher levels of education or savings, so we would want 
to encourage as much as possible across the board.  As a result, a per-claimant cap may no 
longer be a good fit.    
Likewise, a child credit can have this sort of hybrid quality, since it can be used to pursue 
different goals.  One is to avoid societal problems from a shrinking population, such as an 
inadequate labor force or bankrupt social insurance.  To do so, we would encourage more 
children overall, without regard to who is having them (an aggregate subsidy).  However, a 
different goal is to provide assistance to families who especially need it.  This goal requires us to 
account for each family’s particular circumstances (e.g., income, number of children), so that an 
individual-by-individual analysis becomes relevant.   
To sum up, then, a subsidy generally should equal the (net) positive marginal 
externalities it generates.  In structuring a tax expenditure, then, we have to account for the 
different reasons why it generates positive (or negative) externalities – or, at least, to decide 
which is our priority.  As a result, some subsidies need to be calibrated on an individual-by-
individual basis, while some do not.  Obviously, these are difficult and contestable decisions, 
especially since we also should account for excess burden and distribution.  Given the fine-
tuning that is necessary, one-size-fits-all limits are unlikely to succeed. 
7. Who Allocates the Funding?: Bureaucratic Strategies 
In addition to defining the conduct, identifying the claimants, and calibrating the amount 
of the subsidy, we should consider who should make these decisions.  Another tightening 
strategy, then, is to identify which part of the government is best positioned to make and 
implement these judgments.         
There are familiar arguments for converting tax expenditures to direct expenditures, as 
Stanley Surrey and others have urged in an extensive literature.
99
  For example, instead of 
excluding the interest on state bonds from federal taxes, the federal government can make grants 
for projects vetted by federal experts.  The hope is that these experts can generate more 
programmatic benefits per dollar than an inexpert tax bureaucracy.
100
  Likewise, congressional 
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 See, e.g.,Richard R. Nelson & Edmund S. Phelps, Investment in Humans, Technological Diffusion and Economic 
Growth,  56 Am Econ. Rev. 69 (1966) (positing that education has positive externalities in facilitating technological 
innovation, and in enabling a society to apply these innovations more rapidly and more broadly). 
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 Stanley S. Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform: The Concept of Tax Expenditures 98-100 (1973); Stanley S. Surrey & 
Paul R. McDaniel, Tax Expenditures 108-11(1985). 
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  One way to address this issue is for the tax system to partner with another part of the government.  To claim a 
low-income housing credit, for instance, a taxpayers must be chosen by a state housing finance agency.    
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committees with greater substantive expertise would monitor these programs, instead of the tax 
committees.
101
   
On the other hand, sometimes tax experts in Congress and the executive branch have a 
comparative advantage in making these judgments.  This is likely to be the case, for instance, 
when subsidies are means-tested (e.g., EITC) or allocated passively to avoid politicized decisions 
(e.g., R&D and charity).  The tax system also can have an advantage when the goal is to 
communicate information or influence norms.  If the government wants to endorse particular 
behavior – as a way to promote more favorable attitudes about it among citizens – this “stamp of 
approval” has to be communicated in a way that citizens will notice.  Nearly all citizens file 
returns, so the tax system can be an effective channel for this sort of message.   
In any event, the issues discussed so far generally remain relevant if a tax expenditure is 
converted to a direct expenditure.  We still have to decide how precisely to define the favored 
conduct, which claimants to favor, how generous the subsidy should be, whether it should be 
capped, and so on.  Ultimately, the choice of whether to keep a subsidy in the tax system turns on 
the factual and institutional context.
102
  Obviously, excess burden and distribution are also 
relevant.
103
  So once again, a one-size-fits-all answer will not be reliable.  In any event, given the 
extensive attention this issue has received elsewhere, it is not the focus of this Article.   
8. Caveat: Transition Costs 
Finally, when we consider whether to scale back a tax expenditure, we also have to 
account for familiar issues that arise with any change of policy.  Given the extensive literature on 
transitions,
104
 the discussion here is very brief.  In deciding how rapidly to phase in an otherwise 
desirable reform, we need to balance long term gains against short-term impact.  Even for the 
same policy change, these short-term consequences vary with the context.  For example, scaling 
back the mortgage interest deduction could have had positive short-term effects in 2003, taking 
steam out of the housing bubble.  But in 2009, after the bubble burst, further pressure on this 
distressed market would have been problematic in the short term.    
We also need to consider the benefits and costs of encouraging people to anticipate policy 
changes.  There are familiar advantages when doing so persuades them not to engage in socially 
destructive behavior.  At the same time, there is a downside.  If taxpayers discount tax 
expenditures for the possibility of repeal, they are less responsive to them.  This raises the cost of 
inducing socially valuable behavior.  Again, the balance of these (and other) factors – and, thus, 
the transition policy we want in a given case – will depend on the context. 
     * * * 
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  Kleinbard, supra note 35 (”The substantive committees do not supervise how tax subsidies are designed or spent, 
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 Weisbach & Nissim, supra. 
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 See infra Part III.C.2.a & III.D.2.a. 
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 For an analysis of this and other transition issues, see generally Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of 
Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47, 57-58 (1977); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of 
Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509 (1986); Daniel N. Shaviro, When Rules Change (2000).   
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To sum up, then, a key goal in scaling back tax expenditures is saving money while 
preserving (most) programmatic benefits.  There are a number of ways to do this, and we should 
choose the one best suited to our policy priority and the factual context.  In some cases, we 
should narrow the definition of what is funded.  In others, we should target the right claimants or 
limit how much they can claim.  In still other cases, we should use a different government 
agency to implement the subsidy.  On all these policy dimensions, strategies that work for one 
tax expenditure will not necessarily work for another. 
C. Potential Tradeoff: Does Repealing or Limiting a Tax Expenditure Add 
to Excess Burden? 
 Even if a limit is effective at preserving programmatic benefits, we face a tradeoff if it 
exacerbates excess burden or undermines our distributional goals.  These issues are discussed in 
this Section and Section D, respectively.  To assess the impact on excess burden, this Section 
considers three questions.  First, how (if at all) would repeal or a limit affect the effective 
marginal tax rate, or otherwise influence labor and savings decisions?  Second, how would repeal 
or a limit influence compliance, enforcement, and other administrative costs?  Third, how would 
it impact deadweight loss from tax planning?              
1. Effect on Labor and Savings Decisions 
 
a. Weakening Tax Expenditures that Promote Work or Savings 
Repealing or limiting a tax expenditure can affect labor and savings decisions in five 
ways.  First, if a tax expenditure (or some other government program) is effective in encouraging 
work or savings, repealing or limiting it can have the opposite effect.  For example, if the EITC 
successfully promotes work, scaling it back can induce some to leave the workforce.  On the 
other hand, if a tax expenditure is a complement to leisure, repealing or limiting it can encourage 
work.  For instance, if the tax-free treatment of workman’s compensation tempts claimants to 
seek it even if they are able to work,
105
 repealing this tax benefit eliminates this temptation.       
b. Base-Broadening to Cut Marginal Rates (or Keep them from Rising)  
 Second, even if a tax expenditure has no obvious connection to savings or work choices, 
repealing or limiting it can still alter a taxpayer’s effective marginal rate.  Even more than 
average rates, marginal rates influence labor and savings decisions.
106
  A familiar rationale for 
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 Hines & Logue, supra note 19, at 17 (“High marginal tax rates depress the production of taxable income by 
encouraging early retirement, reducing work effort of primary and secondary earners, and giving taxpayers 
incentives to pursue investments and other opportunities that reduce taxable income.”); see also Harvey S. Rosen, 
What Is Labor Supply and Do Taxes Affect It? 70 AM. ECON. REV. 171 (1980); Emmanuel Saez, Joel Slemrod & 
Seth H. Giertz, The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review, 50 J. 
ECON. LIT. 3 (2012);   Manning & Andress, supra note 23, at 1586 (“This article concentrates on marginal rates 
rather than average rates or overall tax burden on the ground that marginal rates are the items that should affect 
economic decisions, determining the net after-tax value of engaging in activities to earn additional income or the net 
after-tax cost of making expenditures that result in additional deductions.”).  Or it might be, as Joel Slemrod and 
Wojciech Kopczuk have argued, that broadening the base makes taxable income less elastic – for instance, by 
foreclosing certain types of planning – so that we can raise rates at a lower efficiency cost.  Joel Slemrod & 
Wojciech Kopczuk, The Optimal Elasticity of Taxable Income, 84 J. PUB. ECON. 91 (2002). 
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repeal or limits, then, is to fund a cut in marginal rates (or to keep these rates from rising).  This 
effect does not stem from the limit itself, but from the way we use the savings it generates.  
Obviously, it can arise with direct expenditures as well (e.g., if we cut government spending to 
fund a marginal rate cut).    
c. Bracket Creep  
 Third, repeal or a limit alters the effective marginal rate more directly by reducing a 
taxpayer’s deductions or exclusions, and thus bumping her into a higher bracket.107  For 
example, a taxpayer would be in the 25% bracket with $20,000 of deductions and $100,000 of 
income, but would move to the 28% bracket upon losing $8000 of deductions (since the top of 
the 25% bracket is $87,850).  This Article calls this result “bracket creep,” analogizing to a 
comparable effect of inflation.  Bracket creep can affect anyone who is not already in the top 
bracket.  It arises in scaling back exclusions and deductions, but not credits (which offset tax 
directly, instead of reducing taxable income).  This effect arises with (some) tax expenditures, 
but not with other government programs.   
 To eliminate bracket creep, we can “index” the bracket by raising its upper bound.  For 
example, if a limit disallows an average of $5,000 of deductions, we can raise the top of each 
bracket by $5,000.  Yet this remedy is imperfect, since those who lose less than $5,000 receive a 
windfall, while those who lose more still experience some bracket creep.
108
 
d. Income-Based Limits   
Fourth, some limits change the effective marginal rate by tying the disallowance of tax 
benefits to income.  If earning more causes us to lose more deductions, exclusions, or credits, a 
limit functions as a marginal rate increase.  By contrast, if earning more entitles us to use more of 
them, a limit reduces the effective rate.  These changes in the effective tax rate are oblique 
instead of explicit, so taxpayers who do not notice them may not change their behavior.
109
  Part 
III analyzes seven types of limits to show which change the effective rate in this way, and which 
do not.  In principle, any government benefit or penalty tied to income could have this effect, 
including direct expenditures (and fines) as well as tax expenditures.       
e. Reduced Purchasing Power 
Finally, scaling back a tax expenditure (or, indeed, any subsidy) also makes the favored 
activity more expensive.  For instance, taxpayers who used to deduct charitable contributions, 
but no longer can, have to spend more after-tax dollars on them.
110
  This reduced purchasing 
power weakens the incentive to work in some cases, but strengthens it in others.  Someone 
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 Alan J. Auerbach & Joel Slemrod, The Economic Effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, J. ECON. LIT. 589, 602 
(1997) (“Such a tax reform decreases the real wage in terms of the previously preferred activity”). 
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whose main motive in working is to fund her favorite charity might be more tempted to retire.
111
    
But someone who is already locked into a charitable pledge, which has become more expensive, 
must earn more to honor it.  If a subsidy is cut, people who were spending marginal dollars on 
the subsidized activity – that is, dollars they might choose not to earn – are more likely to adjust 
work choices than people who spend infra-marginal dollars.
112
  Likewise, heavy users of a 
newly-limited tax expenditure obviously are affected more than light users.  For example, 
limiting the mortgage deduction could have no effect on renters (unless, of course, rent increases 
as more want to rent).  As a result, the magnitude (and even the direction) of these effects 
vary.
113
 
2. Effect on Administrative Costs and Planning  
 In addition to affecting labor and savings choices, repealing or limiting a tax expenditure 
(or other government program) can also affect administrative costs and planning.  On one hand, 
if a tax expenditure adds significantly to these social costs, repealing or limiting it can reduce 
them.  For example, rampant fraud is a familiar reason to scale back a tax expenditure.
114
  On the 
other hand, the limit itself can add to excess burden.  It is another tax rule to be drafted, 
understood and enforced, and also can prompt new planning strategies.  Once again, the net 
effect depends on the context.  This subsection gives examples of how the five tightening 
strategies discussed above can affect administrative costs and planning.     
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 If the charitable deduction were unlimited, this taxpayer could fund this goal with pretax income, so that her 
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 The Optimal Elasticity of Taxable Income, 84 J. PUB. ECON. 91 (2002). 
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a. Definitional Strategies 
 In defining the favored activity more precisely, we face a familiar tradeoff.  A more 
tailored tax expenditure (or other subsidy) focuses more effectively on high-value activities, but 
is more challenging to draft.  Enforcement and compliance may be costlier as well if the rule 
requires taxpayers to keep careful records or apply nuanced distinctions.  For instance, assume 
we want to subsidize health care that creates positive externalities, but not care that yields only 
private benefits.  One option is to classify all types of care (e.g., covering vaccinations but not 
cosmetic surgery).  Alternatively, we can disallow a standard percentage of the deduction or 
exclusion (a “haircut”) to approximate this effect, as we do with business entertainment.  This 
blunter approach is cheaper to administer, but is only approximately right at best.       
b. Elasticity Strategies 
A similar tradeoff arises in tailoring a tax expenditure (or other subsidy) to the claimant’s 
responsiveness.  Administrative costs increase, and planning may as well.  For example, we can 
disallow charitable deductions below a certain amount each year.  This floor reduces record 
keeping, and also avoids subsiding some contributions that would be made anyway.   
Yet taxpayers can react by concentrating multi-year gifts into a single year.  For example, 
a taxpayer who earns $500,000 and gives $25,000 to charity each year would lose 20% of her 
deduction ($5,000 of $25,000) if we impose a 1% floor.  But if she gives $50,000 every other 
year, she loses only 10% (5,000/50,000).  She gives the same amount on average but cuts her 
disallowed deductions in half.   
This sort of “bunching” is less likely, though, when claimants do not fully control the 
timing of their giving.  For example, they may have to make a gift for a particular event, such as 
a religious holiday or an annual dinner.  It is likely, moreover, that some claimants will be less 
rigorous about shifting their donations, and some nonprofits will be less accommodating.  For 
claimants who cannot move all their charity, there is less advantage to shifting any of it.  For 
instance, if the floor is $200 – and a claimant has at least $200 of charity that cannot be moved – 
the floor no longer creates an incentive to shift other contributions.  This is more likely to 
happen, of course, when the floor is low. 
Even for high floors, moreover, the motive to concentrate deductions is offset, to an 
extent, by a counterveiling incentive to spread them more evenly: if “bunching” moves us to a 
lower tax bracket, it reduces the value of some of our deductions.  For example, assume a 
married couple has $500,000 of income.  If they claim $40,000 of deductions each year, they 
remain in the 39.6% bracket (which governs taxable income above $457,100 in 2014).  As a 
result, all their deductions are worth 39.6 cents per dollar.  But what if instead they claim 
$80,000 in 2014 and no deductions in 2015?  This “bunching’ moves them to the 35% bracket 
(which governs taxable income above $405,100).  As a result, over $37,000 of the deductions 
they accelerate are worth only 35 cents per dollar (in reducing taxable income from $457,600 to 
$420,000).
115
  This cost of “bunching “ arises only if a tax expenditure’s value varies with the tax 
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bracket; as a result, it applies to deductions and exclusions, but not credits.  The magnitude of 
this cost depends on how steep the rate structure is, and also how close a claimant is to a lower 
bracket.  For instance, those earning $3,000,000 are unlikely to be affected, since they need to 
“bunch” almost $2.5 million of deductions to move to a lower bracket.     
c. Comparative Advantage Strategies 
Just as tradeoffs arise in calibrating a subsidy to elasticity, they can arise also in targeting 
claimants who use a tax expenditure (or other subsidy) most effectively.  For example, sorting 
with substantive criteria (e.g., based on weather or geography) can add to administrative costs, 
since they have to be formulated and enforced.  Using a competitive process can also be 
expensive, since government personnel will be needed to run it and claimants will incur costs in 
participating.  In contrast, matching requirements (like the ones used for R&D and charity) are 
simple to administer, once we set the right level for the match.  Screening by income is also easy, 
since the tax system has to measure income anyway.      
d. Activity-Level Strategies 
Imposing an overall or per-claimant cap on tax expenditures (or other subsidies) also can 
add to administrative costs.  Yet if we do not make this investment, the subsidy may not be 
allocated as effectively.  In some cases, administrative costs are not only the consequence of 
varying the reimbursement rate, but also the cause.  Tracking an expense (such as a charitable 
contribution) could be cost-justified at a high level, but not a low level.  This tradeoff will vary 
for different tax expenditures.  For example, it is probably easier to track low levels of mortgage 
interest (usually paid to a single bank) than low levels of charity (often paid to multiple causes). 
e. Bureaucratic Strategies 
Finally, a familiar argument for converting tax expenditures to direct expenditures is 
reducing administrative costs.  Yet the argument is not persuasive if costs are merely shifted 
within the government.
116
  Once again, the answer depends on the context.  Administrative costs 
rise if the tax system has to develop expertise that already exists elsewhere in government, but 
not if the tax system already has the relevant expertise (e.g., in making income-based 
judgments).
117
  Moreover, piggybacking on private sector judgments, as with R&D and charity, 
does not require much substantive expertise. 
  * * * 
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To sum up, then, a second goal in scaling back tax expenditures is reducing excess 
burden (or, at least, minimizing increases).  Effects on labor and savings choices, administrative 
costs and planning are all important, and also context-specific.  Sometimes our programmatic 
and excess burden goals are compatible, but sometimes they are in tension. 
D. Potential Tradeoff: Does Repealing or Limiting a Tax Expenditure 
Undermine Distribution? 
 In repealing or limiting tax expenditures, we want to save money, preserve programmatic 
benefits, and minimize excess burden.  In assessing our progress on these dimensions, we have to 
account for distribution.  Effects on low-income taxpayers – both benefits and costs – are 
especially significant because of the declining marginal utility of money.  How much of a 
premium we assign to their welfare depends on our social welfare function.
118
  To determine a 
limit’s effect on distribution, we should consider three issues.  First, who is helped (or hurt) by a 
tax expenditure under current law?  Second, how does the answer change if we limit the tax 
expenditure in various ways?  Third, if a limit has adverse distributional effects, can we 
compensate by adjusting other aspects of the tax and transfer system?  These issues are 
considered in turn. 
1. The Distributional Impact of Tax Expenditures Under Current Law 
   
a. Tax Benefits for Most Tax Expenditures Flow Disproportionately to 
High-Income Taxpayers 
If a tax expenditure (or, indeed, any government program) disproportionately helps high 
income taxpayers, scaling it back would enhance vertical equity.  But how do we know who is 
benefitting? One measure for tax expenditures, which is conventional but imperfect, focuses on 
who claims the tax benefit.  By this standard, high-income taxpayers are the clear winners for 
most tax expenditures.  For example, 80% of the tax benefit for itemized deductions went to the 
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top 20% in 2011.
119
  Likewise, 2/3 of exclusions went to the top 20%, including employer-
provided health insurance and investment income in retirement accounts.
120
   
These tax benefits flow mostly to high-income taxpayers for four familiar reasons.  The 
first three apply only to tax expenditures, while the fourth could apply to other subsidies as well.  
First, if taxpayers do not earn enough to owe income tax, a tax expenditure cannot reduce their 
tax bill (unless it is refundable or applies to the payroll tax).
121
  Second, even among those who 
pay income tax, only those who itemize (instead of claiming the standard deduction) are eligible 
for some tax expenditures. This subset – less than one-third of filers in 2011 (38.4 million)122 – 
tends to have higher incomes.  Nearly half (18 million) had more than $100,000 of income, while 
over 10% (4 million) had more than $200,000.
123
  Third, exclusions and deductions are more 
valuable in a higher bracket.  Excluding a dollar – that is, not paying tax on it – saves thirty-five 
cents for someone taxed at 35%, but only twenty-five cents for someone taxed at 25%.  This 
“upside down effect” does not arise with credits, which reduce the tax itself instead of taxable 
income (so a one-dollar credit reduces tax by one dollar).
124
  Finally, high income taxpayers tend 
to spend more on subsidized expenses, such as health insurance, 401(k) plans, and mortgage 
interest.
125
  For example, taxpayers earning over $200k averaged eight times more mortgage 
interest than those earning between $40k and $50k in 2011 ($5,021 versus $642).
126
   
If a tax expenditure disproportionately reduces the taxes of high income taxpayers, 
limiting it usually raises their taxes.  If the limit also enhances efficiency – for instance, by 
offering more programmatic “bang for the buck” or reducing excess burden – it offers a unique 
opportunity.   Although efficiency and distribution are often in tension, here they would be 
aligned. 
b. Refundable Credits and Other Safety Net Tax Expenditures 
 Even so, distribution and efficiency sometimes are still in tension for two reasons.  First, 
some tax expenditures are claimed solely (or primarily) by low-income taxpayers, so that 
limiting them would disproportionately affect this cohort.  For example, the EITC is available 
even to those who do not otherwise owe tax, as is the health coverage tax credit, the credit for 
excess social security withholding, the “making work pay” credit, the homebuyer credit, and 
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portions of the child credit and American opportunity credit (for college expenses).
127
  The 
bottom 60% of taxpayers claimed 80% of tax benefits from refundable credits in 2011.
128
  
Usually, refundable credits are justified as much by distribution as by externalities – and, in 
some cases, more so.  As a result, there is a strong case for keeping them if they are successful.  
Yet even then, it would be better still to generate comparable distribution-based benefits at lower 
cost, if we can.  
c. Challenges in Measuring Incidence 
 Second, even if low income taxpayers are not the ones claiming a tax expenditure (or 
other subsidy), they may still benefit economically from it, so that scaling it back is costly to 
them.  For example, when high-income taxpayers deduct charitable contributions for soup 
kitchens or need-based scholarships, economic benefits flow to low-income people.
129
  Yet 
charity to art museums or the opera is likely to have different distributional effects.  Similarly, 
although the tax benefit for municipal bond interest goes to (wealthy) bondholders, much of the 
economic benefit goes to states (in reducing their borrowing costs).  Likewise, while the 
deduction for state and local taxes is claimed by high-income people, it can help states collect 
more tax.  For both of these tax expenditures, then, we need to know how states use the extra 
money.  Enhancing social services for low-income citizens obviously has different effects than 
cutting property taxes on high end residences. 
Needless to say, sometimes economic benefits actually do flow to the person claiming the 
tax benefit.  For instance, when a high income taxpayer deducts mortgage interest on a vacation 
home in Vale or East Hampton, the government is funding private benefits for her (as well as 
neighborhood-related externalities for a wealthy community).  Likewise, gold-plated health plans 
can provide private benefits to high income taxpayers.   
 Ultimately, then, we need to know a tax expenditure’s economic incidence to assess its 
distributional impact.
130
  Unfortunately, this much harder than establishing who is claiming the 
tax benefit.  A rough guess may be the best we can do.  Nevertheless, a rough answer to the right 
question is more helpful than a precise answer to the wrong question.  In deciding whether to 
repeal or limit a tax expenditure, then, we need to consider whether low income taxpayers are its 
main economic beneficiaries, even if they are not the ones claiming the tax benefit. 
2. The Distributional Impact of the Limit 
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Repealing a tax expenditure eliminates all the tax and economic benefits it provides.  But 
a limit eliminates only some of these benefits, affecting some claimants more than others.  For 
example, if we deny a tax expenditure to those earning more than $150,000, those earning less 
can still claim the tax benefit.  Sometimes this sort of disparity brings us closer to the distribution 
we want, but sometimes it has the opposite effect.  A context-specific analysis is needed to 
determine a limit’s effect on distribution.  This subsection offers examples drawn from the five 
tightening strategies discussed above.      
a. Definitional Strategies 
One approach is to define favored conduct in a way that advances distributional goals. 
For instance, some fringe benefits are subsidized only if offered to all employees.  Including this 
“nondiscrimination” rule in the relevant definition creates an incentive to cover low-income 
employees, not just senior managers.  Likewise, one subsidy for home ownership excludes gains 
from selling a primary residence, but not a vacation home.
131
  This carveout is more likely to 
burden high-income taxpayers.  Notably, there is no similar exception for the mortgage interest 
deduction.  Adding one, as President Bush’s 2005 tax reform panel suggested, would save 
money in a progressive way.
132
 
In other cases, though, narrower definitions are an ineffective or costly way to pursue 
distributional goals.  For instance, although we might want to offer the charitable deduction only 
to causes that help low-income beneficiaries, this would be difficult to administer.  While soup 
kitchens obviously qualify, and the opera probably does not, many causes are hard to classify.  
Disaster relief, for example, is relevant to everyone, but can be especially important to low-
income people.  In addition, what if a charity has some functions that qualify, and some that do 
not?  To deal with this, we could make separate judgments about each gift, depending on how it 
is used.  For instance, gifts to educational institutions would pass muster if they support financial 
aid, but not professorships or building projects.  Yet this approach founders on the fungibility of 
money.  After all, some gifts to financial aid do not actually increase the financial aid budget; 
instead, they allow the school to allocate less tuition to financial aid, freeing up this revenue for 
other initiatives.  An alternative, then, is to treat all contributions as tax-advantaged, as long as a 
sufficient percentage of the organization’s budget funds qualifying activities.  But some 
budgetary items would be hard to classify (e.g., the CEO’s salary or rent for the building), and 
we would have to retest periodically.  This approach also penalizes nonprofit “conglomerates” 
that serve low-income populations while also pursuing other goals.  In any event, the more 
general point is that a more focused definition is an effective way to pursue distributional goals 
in some settings, but not others.  Once again, the context matters.   
b. Elasticity Strategies 
The same is true when we tighten a tax expenditure by favoring claimants who are most 
responsive.  High-income claimants usually are easier to influence because they have more 
capacity in their budgets, as noted above.  While this is a reason to allocate a subsidy primarily to 
them, distributional goals are undercut if the subsidy offers them private benefits (as with 
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subsidized vacation homes and “gold plated” health insurance) or creates externalities that do not 
benefit low-income people (as with charity to the opera).  Even so, there is no tradeoff if the 
externalities benefit everyone (as with solar panels) or especially benefit low-income citizens (as 
with charity to soup kitchens).  In these cases, focusing on elasticity can improve distribution by 
enabling the program to help low-income people more efficiently. 
c. Comparative Advantage Strategies 
Similarly, there is no one-size-fits-all answer when we favor claimants who can use a 
subsidy most effectively.  If a claimant’s comparative advantage derives from financial need (as 
when we subsidize retirement savings to promote self-sufficiency), favoring this claimant 
advances distributional goals.  Yet in other cases, there can be a tradeoff with distribution.  For 
instance, what if a claimant’s comparative advantage derives from expertise, as with an R&D 
subsidy?  Distributional goals are still advanced if the subsidy generates positive externalities for 
everyone (e.g., in curing a disease), but can be undercut if the subsidy generates private benefits 
for experts with high incomes (e.g., in raising the pay of medical researchers).  The economic 
incidence of the tax expenditure obviously is important, and it varies with the context.    
d. Activity-Level Strategies 
We also encounter this sort of context-specific variability in calibrating how much to 
subsidize each claimant.  Sometimes this sort of fine tuning advances distributional goals.  For 
example, we might decide to cap a subsidy for health insurance because low-income claimants 
rarely have gold-plated policies.  Indeed, if distribution is our priority, we might prefer to phase 
out the subsidy instead of capping it, so only low-income claimants are eligible.  In other cases, 
however, a per-claimant cap or phaseout would undercut distributional goals.  This would be the 
case with charity supporting soup kitchens, as well as with other tax expenditures that generates 
positive externalities for low-income people (instead of private benefits for high-income 
claimants). 
e. Bureaucratic Strategies 
Finally, we see the same variation in deciding whether to use a tax expenditure or a direct 
expenditure.  For example, a familiar disadvantage of pursuing distributional goals with tax 
expenditures is the “upside down” effect: deductions and exclusions offer more generous tax 
benefits in higher brackets (although refundable credits avoid this issue).  In addition, the tax 
system sometimes is less effective in imposing distribution-based conditions on how money is 
used.  For instance, if the federal government wants to fund states programs for low-income 
citizens, the deduction for state income tax offers less control than block grants.  Nevertheless, 
the tax system has a notable advantage in pursuing distributional goals: a sophisticated capacity 
to measure income and dispense money.
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3. Compensating Adjustments 
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To sum up, then, it is important to account for distribution when we consider scaling back 
tax expenditures.  In some cases, distribution justifies the limit (e.g., if a tax expenditure 
disproportionately benefits high-income people).  In other cases, distribution is a reason not to 
impose a limit, or at least is a cost to be managed (e.g., if a tax expenditure helps low-income 
people, but in a costly or inefficient way).  In other words, sometimes efficiency and 
distributional goals align, but sometimes they are in tension.   
When there is a tradeoff, a familiar way to manage it is to adopt a limit that promotes 
efficiency, while advancing distribution another way.  For example, assume we want to limit the 
earned income tax credit to keep claimants from committing fraud, but this limit would undercut 
distribution by also affecting honest claimants.  To offset this distributional cost, we can pair the 
limit with a payroll tax cut for low income taxpayers.  As a result, we achieve the distribution we 
want – or at least approximate it – in a more efficient way.     
Unfortunately, this sort of offsetting distributional adjustment is not always feasible.  
Some involve efficiency costs of their own, while others are politically unattainable.  When an 
offsetting adjustment is not available, it becomes more important to accommodate distribution 
within the four corners of the limit.  In managing this sort of tradeoff, we should compare 
different types of limits and choose the one that enhances welfare the most, once all the 
competing factors are considered.   
III. Floors, Caps, and Fractions: Seven Limits and the Tradeoffs They Involve 
To determine what offsetting adjustments we need, or to select the limit that enhances 
welfare the most on its own, we have to understand the tradeoffs inherent in each limit.  This Part 
analyzes seven types of limits: fixed-dollar floors; income-based floors; fixed-dollar caps; 
income-based caps; phaseouts; maximum fractions; and haircuts.  Each modifies the marginal 
reimbursement rate in a different way.  As a result, they have varying effects on programmatic 
incentives, excess burden, and distribution, and thus involve different tradeoffs.  Some are 
especially useful for activity-level strategies, while others are a good fit for elasticity strategies.  
Again, there is no one-size-fits-all answer, so context-specific analysis is critical.  
A. Fixed-Dollar Floors 
One option is to use a floor, which keeps a tax expenditure from supporting low levels of 
favored activity.  A “fixed dollar” floor defines this level as a fixed amount (instead of a 
percentage of income).  For example, we can subsidize charitable contributions only to the extent 
they exceed $500.
134
       
1. Programmatic Benefits 
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A floor eliminates programmatic incentives for activity below the minimum level, but 
preserves them above this level.  With a $500 floor, for instance, a taxpayer is subsidized for 
increasing charitable giving from $500 to $1,000,
135
 but not from 0 to $500.   
In preserving programmatic incentives for high activity levels, fixed-dollar floors offer 
two advantages.  First, they focus the subsidy on these higher levels.  As a result, fixed-dollar 
floors are well suited to aggregate subsidies that encourage as much activity as possible, without 
regard to who is engaging in it (e.g., green energy and charity).  Second, floors help avoid 
subsidizing what the taxpayer would do anyway. If most people give at least $500 to charity 
without a subsidy, a $500 floor concentrates the subsidy where it is more likely to change 
behavior.  Thus, a floor is a good fit for elasticity strategies.  Picking the right level is a 
challenge, though, since one that is marginal for some is too high (or low) for others.   
While a floor is well suited to these goals, it is a poor fit for motivating the first dollar of 
spending.  Subsidizing low activity levels is essential in encouraging everyone to commit at least 
a minimum amount to retirement savings, health insurance, or some other favored activity.  
These individually-based subsidies need to motivate claimants who otherwise would spend 
nothing (or very little).  Floors keep subsidies from reaching these people.    
2. Excess Burden 
Floors have the further disadvantage of increasing planning costs.  As noted above, they 
encourage taxpayers to concentrate multi-year spending into a single tax year (e.g., giving 
charity every other year).  This strategy can reduce the amount disallowed by the floor.
136
  Even 
so, floors can reduce compliance costs.  As noted above, those who spend less than the floor do 
not need to keep records.  
3. Distribution 
Just as fixed-dollar floors have mixed effects on programmatic incentives and excess 
burden, they also can affect distribution in different ways.  To help low-income people, we 
sometimes have to subsidize the first dollar.  This can be important, for instance, in encouraging 
them to save for retirement or buy health insurance.  The first dollar is more likely to be marginal 
for low-income claimants than high-income ones, who usually take these steps on their own.  In 
this sort of “self-sufficiency” initiative, then, a floor can disproportionately exclude low-income 
claimants.  More generally, a fixed-dollar floor is likely to be more daunting to low-income 
claimants than high income ones.  Given the diminishing marginal utility of money, committing 
a fixed amount of money is harder for those who earn less.   
Yet this is a problem only if low-income people have to claim a subsidy in order to 
benefit from it.  This is not the case with charity for soup kitchens, for instance, or with some 
environmental initiatives.  If a tax expenditure creates externalities that benefit low-income 
people – even when they are not the ones claiming it – a floor can generate these externalities 
more efficiently, thereby enhancing distribution. 
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4. Tradeoffs 
To sum up, then, fixed-dollar floors can be appealing when our goal is to encourage as 
much favored activity as possible (e.g., green energy or charity).  These floors offer more 
programmatic “bang for the buck” by not funding (some) infra-marginal activity.  They also can 
reduce record-keeping burdens.  However, fixed-dollar floors are not at all tailored to 
heterogeneity.  They will be too high for some claimants and too low for others.  A further 
disadvantage is that they can encourage taxpayers to consolidate multi-year spending into a 
single year.
137
  In addition, we should not use fixed-dollar floors when the goal is to encourage at 
least a minimum level of favored activity (e.g., ensuring that everyone has health insurance), and 
also in other contexts where the participation of low-income claimants is important.    
    Table 1: Fixed-Dollar Floors 
Programmatic Benefits  
Benefits for High Activity Levels With 
Valuable Externalities 
Yes 
Benefits for High Activity Levels With 
Diminishing Returns 
Yes 
Benefits for Essential First Dollar No 
Benefits for Infra-marginal First Dollar No 
Benefits for Responsive Wealthy Claimants Yes 
Benefits for Infra-marginal Wealthy Claimants Yes 
Excess Burden  
Increased Complexity  Yes 
Increased Cost for Favored Activity Yes 
Bracket Creep Yes 
Disguised Rate Increase Yes 
Spreading No 
Bunching Yes 
Distribution  
Disproportionate Cuts for Wealthy Claimants No 
Mitigated “Upside Down” Effect No 
Cost-Effective Externalities for Low-Income 
3
rd
 Parties 
Yes 
 
B. Income-Based Floors 
Instead of defining a floor as a fixed amount, we can define it as a percentage of the 
taxpayer’s income (an “income-based floor”).  For example, we can limit the charitable 
deduction to contributions above 1% of AGI, as President Bush’s tax reform panel suggested.138  
While income-based floors share most of the advantages and disadvantages of fixed-dollar 
                                                          
137
 Ackerman & Auten, supra note 21, at 513; Louis Kaplow, The Standard Deduction and Floors in the Income 
Tax, 50 TAX L. REV. 1 (1994)at 27 (arguing that it is easy to “bunch” payments when we control the timing of them, 
so that charity is easier to “bunch” than mortgage interest). 
138
 Bush Tax Panel, supra, at 75. 
40 
 
floors, they are somewhat more effective at accommodating elasticity and pursuing distributional 
goals. Nevertheless, they have the offsetting disadvantage of increasing the effective marginal 
rate. 
1. Programmatic Incentives 
Like fixed-dollar floors, income-based floors maintain programmatic incentives above 
the floor.  In so doing, they are more effective in accounting for elasticity.  When we estimate 
how much a claimant would give to charity without a subsidy, for example, a percentage of 
income is more reliable than a fixed dollar amount.  After all, a $500 floor is probably too high 
for someone earning $30,000 and too low for someone earning $1,000,000.  One percent of 
income is likely to be closer to the mark for each ($300 and $10,000, respectively).  As a result, 
income-based floors are a good choice for encouraging as much activity as possible, without 
regard to who is engaging in it (e.g., green energy and charity).  They also share a key limitation 
of fixed-dollar floors: both are a poor choice for encouraging everyone to engage in at least a 
minimum level of favored activity (e.g., retirement savings and health insurance).    
2. Excess Burden 
With one important difference, income-based floors have the same effects on excess 
burden as fixed-dollar floors.  On the positive side of the ledger, they eliminate some record-
keeping.  On the negative side, both encourage taxpayers to “bunch” multi-year spending into a 
single year.   
Yet income-based floors have a disadvantage that fixed-dollar floors do not share: when 
claimants earn more money, they lose more of the tax expenditure.  For example, the Pease rule 
increases the effective marginal rate in this way.  Although this provision often is described as a 
phaseout, it actually is an income-based floor.
139
  Taxpayers lose 3 cents of itemized deductions 
for every dollar of income they earn above a threshold ($300,000 for an individual).
140
  For 
taxpayers in the 39.6 bracket, losing 3 cents of deductions costs 1.2 cents (3*.396).  This is a 
1.2% increase in the effective marginal rate.
141
  A 1% floor on charitable deductions has a similar 
effect.  An additional one hundred dollars of earnings eliminates one dollar of deductions, 
thereby increasing tax by 39.6 cents, and thus increasing the effective marginal rate by .396% 
(for those in the 39.6% bracket).  By contrast, fixed-dollar floors do not disallow more 
deductions as taxpayers earn more.  A $500 floor remains $500, even if the taxpayer’s income 
increases.
142
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Of course, income-based floors increase the marginal rate in this way only when 
taxpayers actually have deductions to lose.  Someone whose charitable giving is above the floor 
is affected, but someone who has not made any gift to charity is not.  Earning an extra dollar 
would not affect how many deductions the latter can claim.
143
   
3. Distribution 
Like fixed-dollar floors, income-based floors have mixed effects on distribution.  On one 
hand, when a tax expenditure creates externalities that benefit low-income people, such as 
charity for soup kitchens, an income-based floor can help it to do so more efficiently.  On the 
other hand, when a tax expenditure is supposed to encourage low-income people to spend their 
first dollar on favored conduct, such as health insurance or retirement savings, a floor can be 
counterproductive.   
While the distributional implications of both types of floors are similar, they are not the 
same.  There is a difference when the participation of low-income taxpayers is normatively 
important.  In those cases, income-based floors have an advantage in not using the same floor for 
everyone.  After all, giving more than $500 to charity is harder for someone earning $30,000 
than someone earning $1,000,000, as noted above.  Yet although an income-based floor is better, 
it does not solve the problem entirely.  Given the diminishing marginal utility of money, 
contributing 1% is harder for low-income claimants.  In response, we could further reduce the 
floor for those with low incomes (e.g., .5% for those earning $100,000 or less, and 1% for those 
earning more).  Yet as is often the case, solving one problem compounds another: Increasing the 
percentage with income in this way creates a bulge in the effective marginal rate.  For example, 
if the floor is .5% for those earning $100,000 and 1% for those earning more, earning a dollar 
more than $100,000 increases the floor by $500.  This means a one dollar increase in income 
(from $100,000 to $100,001) can increase the tax bill by $140.
144
  Alternatively, if the increase 
from .5% to 1% is phased in over a range, there would be a series of smaller bulges.
145
  Again, 
though, this is an issue only when the participation of low-income claimants is normatively 
important.  
4. Tradeoffs  
Like fixed-dollar floors, income-based floors are helpful in encouraging as much favored 
activity as possible (as with green energy and charity), and in reducing record-keeping burdens.  
These floors offer more programmatic “bang for the buck” by not funding (some) infra-marginal 
activity – indeed, they are better than fixed-dollar floors on this dimension. 
Yet these programmatic advantages must be balanced against effects on excess burden.  
Like fixed-dollar floors, income-based floors encourage taxpayers to consolidate multi-year 
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spending into a single year.
146
  In addition, income-based floors increase the effective marginal 
rate in a way that fixed-dollar floors do not, further sharpening the tradeoff between 
programmatic benefits and excess burden.  In any event, the programmatic advantages do not 
arise – so that income-based floors are a poor fit – when our goal is to encourage at least a 
minimum level of favored activity (e.g., ensuring that everyone saves for retirement, has health 
insurance, etc.).    
   Table 2: Income-Based Floors 
Programmatic Benefits  
Benefits for High Activity Levels With 
Valuable Externalities 
Yes 
Benefits for High Activity Levels With 
Diminishing Returns 
Yes 
Benefits for Essential First Dollar No 
Benefits for Infra-marginal First Dollar No 
Benefits for Responsive Wealthy Claimants Yes 
Benefits for Infra-marginal Wealthy Claimants Yes 
Excess Burden  
Increased Complexity  Yes 
Increased Cost for Favored Activity Yes 
Bracket Creep Yes 
Disguised Rate Increase Yes 
Spreading No 
Bunching Yes 
Distribution  
Disproportionate Cuts for Wealthy Claimants No 
Mitigated “Upside Down” Effect No 
Cost-Effective Externalities for Low-Income 
3
rd
 Parties 
Yes 
 
C. Fixed-Dollar Caps 
The mirror image of a floor is a cap, which imposes a maximum on how much claimants 
can claim.  Caps can be defined as a fixed dollar amount, as when Governor Romney proposed a 
$25,000 cap on itemized deductions.  Unlike floors, caps subsidize the first dollar of spending, 
but (potentially) not the last dollar.  As a result, caps have quite different uses than floors.       
1. Programmatic Incentives 
 A fixed-dollar cap preserves programmatic incentives below the cap, while eliminating 
them above it.  Therefore, they are useful for encouraging at least a minimum level of favored 
activity, but not more.  For example, a cap on the exclusion for employer-provided health 
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insurance enables us to subsidize basic health insurance, but not gold-plated policies.
147
  This 
increases the subsidy’s bang for the buck if basic insurance generates externalities, but gold-
plating yields mostly private benefits, as discussed above.  If marginal positive externalities also 
decline for retirement savings and home ownership subsidies, caps are useful for them as well.  
Not surprisingly, then, fixed dollar caps already govern retirement savings and the health 
insurance exclusion (indirectly, through the “Cadillac tax”).  Likewise, mortgage interest is 
deductible only for mortgages of $1 million or less.  Needless to say, the cap for each tax 
expenditure should be different, since the relevant externalities are different. 
Yet although caps can be a good fit for individualized subsidies, they are not a good fit 
for aggregate subsidies, such as charity or green energy.  Since they eliminate programmatic 
incentives above the cap, they do not encourage as much favored activity as possible, regardless 
of who engages in it.  They also are not a good fit for elasticity strategies, since they do not deny 
the subsidy – or, at least, the first dollar of it – to those who would engage in favored activity 
anyway.   
The level of the cap depends on context-specific factors, such as the rate of decline in 
marginal externalities.  This means it is likely to vary for different tax expenditures.  We will not 
successfully account for these differences if we apply the same cap to each tax expenditure – or, 
for that matter, a single “basket” cap to limit a group of them.   
2. Excess Burden 
Fixed-dollar caps can exacerbate excess burden by increasing compliance and 
enforcement costs.  Taxpayers have to understand and comply with these limits and the 
government must police them.  In addition, these caps can encourage taxpayers to shift expenses 
from one year to another, where there is still capacity in the cap.  For instance, assume the sum 
of all itemized deductions cannot exceed $25,000, and a taxpayer earning $200,000 owes 
$12,000 in state tax.  Since she has only $13,000 of capacity left to deduct mortgage interest and 
charity, she has reason to defer some charity until she has paid off the mortgage.  This sort of 
“spreading” is the mirror image of the “bunching” triggered by floors. 
While fixed-dollar caps share this problem with floors (or, at least, a variation of it), they 
avoid another: Unlike income-based floors, fixed dollar caps do not disallow more deductions as 
taxpayers earn more.  After all, Governor Romney’s cap remains $25,000, whether someone 
earns $50,000 or $150,000.  As a result, fixed-dollar caps do not increase the effective marginal 
rate in the same way.   
Even so, fixed-dollar caps can still affect work incentives in some cases.  By disallowing 
deductions, caps can push taxpayers into a higher bracket.  In addition, caps can reduce the 
returns to working, as measured by after-tax purchasing power.  If someone has delayed 
retirement in order to keep supporting her favorite charity, as noted above, she may stop working 
if her charitable deduction is capped.  Yet a cap can also strengthen work incentives in some 
cases. For example, if someone has already committed to a charitable gift, she has to earn more 
to cover the increased (after-tax) cost of this pledge.  These effects vary depending on whether 
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 The “Cadillac” tax in the Affordable Care Act effectively caps the exclusion, albeit indirectly through an excise 
tax on the health plan. 
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claimants are heavy users of the relevant tax expenditure, and whether they devote marginal 
earnings to it
148
  High income taxpayers are more susceptible to this effect, since they spend 
more on tax-favored expenses, such charity, mortgage interest, and state taxes.    
3. Distribution 
For this reason, a fixed-dollar cap is more likely to take away tax benefits from high-
income taxpayers than low-income taxpayers.  For example, a $25,000 cap on itemized 
deductions is a tight constraint for someone earning $1,000,000, but is unlikely to disallow any 
deductions for someone earning $60,000.  This is a tax increase almost exclusively for high-
income taxpayers.  Yet if we focus on the economic benefits provided by the tax expenditure, 
instead of the tax benefits, the assessment becomes more complex.  For instance, if a cap 
discourages a high-income taxpayer from donating to a soup kitchen, its clientele is also affected. 
4. Tradeoffs 
Caps are extremely appealing when low activity levels generate externalities, but higher 
levels do not add much.  In these cases, caps save money while foreclosing only modest 
externalities.  They also make the tax system more progressive, at least if we focus on tax 
burdens instead of economic benefits.  Although caps can add to compliance costs and planning, 
they do not increase marginal rates in the same way that income-based floors do.  As a result, 
caps can offer a “grand slam” for tax expenditures whose marginal benefits decline as activity 
levels rise.  This might be the case, for instance, for health insurance, mortgage interest, and 
retirement savings, as discussed above.  Yet caps are less helpful when the goal is to encourage 
as much favored activity as possible, since they eliminate programmatic incentives above the 
cap.  They also do not help us avoid subsidizing what claimants would do anyway.    
  Table 3: Fixed-Dollar Caps 
Programmatic Benefits  
Benefits for High Activity Levels With 
Valuable Externalities 
No 
Benefits for High Activity Levels With 
Diminishing Returns 
No 
Benefits for Essential First Dollar Yes 
Benefits for Infra-marginal First Dollar Yes 
Benefits for Responsive Wealthy Claimants Yes 
Benefits for Infra-marginal Wealthy Claimants Yes 
Excess Burden  
Increased Complexity  Yes 
Increased Cost for Favored Activity Yes 
Bracket Creep Yes 
Disguised Rate Increase No 
Spreading Yes 
Bunching No 
Distribution  
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 See supra Part II.C.1.e. 
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Disproportionate Cuts for Wealthy Claimants Yes 
Mitigated “Upside Down” Effect No 
Cost-Effective Externalities for Low-Income 
3
rd
 Parties 
No 
 
D. Income-Based Caps 
Instead of a fixed amount, a cap can be defined as a percentage of income (an “income-
based cap”).  For example, current law limits charitable deductions to 30% (or in some cases 
50%) of AGI.
149
     
1. Programmatic Incentives 
Income-based caps offer largely the same programmatic costs and benefits as fixed-dollar 
caps.  Since they eliminate programmatic incentives above the cap, they are a poor fit for 
encouraging as much activity as possible.  In subsidizing the first dollar of favored activity, they 
risk subsidizing what claimants would do anyway.  Yet like fixed-dollar caps, income-based caps 
are useful for subsidizing a minimum level of favored activity, but not more.   
A notable difference, though, is that income-based caps are less effective when a fixed 
dollar amount is the most precise way to specify the targeted level.  For example, if the goal is to 
subsidize basic (but not gold-plated) health insurance, we should reference the price of an 
average premium.  Since this price represents a different percentage of income for each claimant, 
an income-based cap is a blunt way to target this level.   
Yet income-based caps have an offsetting advantage.  At least to an extent, they are 
automatically indexed for inflation (since incomes rise with inflation), as well as for regional 
variation (since income correlates with regional costs of living).  This is not a trivial advantage.  
After all, if we use the average 2014 premium as a fixed dollar cap for health insurance, but do 
not adjust it for inflation, the cap becomes too low over time.  Likewise, if we use the same 
fixed-dollar cap for the entire nation, it will be too low in some places and too high in others.
150
  
While this problem can be fixed with indexation, income-based caps have the virtue of not 
requiring this remedy. 
2. Excess Burden 
Income-based caps have another advantage not shared by fixed-dollar caps: they reduce 
the effective marginal rate, since earning more frees up more deductions.  For instance, if 
itemized deductions are capped at 10% of AGI, a taxpayer with $500,000 of income can deduct 
only $50,000.  Earning an extra dollar increases deductions by 10 cents, reducing tax by 3.96 
cents in the top bracket.  This cuts the effective marginal rate by 3.96% (from 39.6% to 
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   Or the cap can be defined in terms of the tax benefit, rather than the favored expenditure, as Martin Feldstein 
has proposed. Feldstein, supra note 7. 
150
 Cf. Joseph P. Newhouse, Variations in Health Care Spending: Target Decisionmaking, Not Geography, Institute 
of Medicine of the National Academies (2013), http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=18393 (confirming 
that health care costs vary substantially by region). 
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35.64%).
151
  In this way, income-based caps are the mirror image of income-based floors, which 
increase the effective marginal rate, as noted above.  As a result, income-based caps have the 
added advantage of potentially mitigating labor and savings distortions.   Otherwise, they have 
the same effect on excess burden as fixed-dollar caps.  They increase compliance and 
enforcement costs.  Both also can induce a taxpayer to shift expenses from one year to another, 
as discussed above. 
3. Distribution 
While fixed-dollar caps are tighter constraints on high-income claimants than low-income 
claimants, as noted above, this is not necessarily true of income-based caps.  Although high–
income claimants spend a larger absolute amount on tax-favored expenses, do they spend a 
larger percentage of their income?  They probably do in some cases (e.g., state income tax), but 
not in others (e.g., health insurance).  In addition, we should focus not only on tax benefits 
generated by the tax expenditure, but also on economic benefits.  Again, if a cap keeps high-
income donors from supporting a soup kitchen, the low-income clientele is affected as well.  
4. Tradeoffs 
Like fixed-dollar caps, income-based caps are useful when marginal programmatic 
benefits decline as the activity level rises.  They save money while eliminating programmatic 
incentives that are not especially valuable (although probably in a less precise way than fixed-
dollar caps).  They reduce effective marginal rates (something that fixed-dollar caps do not do), 
and may also make the tax system more progressive, at least if we focus on tax benefits instead 
of on economic benefits.  As a result, income-based caps can offer a “grand slam” for tax 
expenditures whose marginal benefits decline as activity levels rise.  Depending on the empirics, 
this could be true of the health insurance, retirement savings, and mortgage interest examples 
discussed above.     
Yet like fixed-dollar caps, income-based caps are less helpful when the goal is to 
encourage as much favored activity as possible, since they eliminate programmatic incentives 
above the cap.  They also do not help us avoid subsidizing what claimants would do anyway.   
   Table 4: Income-Based Caps 
Programmatic Benefits  
Benefits for High Activity Levels With 
Valuable Externalities 
No 
Benefits for High Activity Levels With 
Diminishing Returns 
No 
Benefits for Essential First Dollar Yes 
Benefits for Infra-marginal First Dollar Yes 
Benefits for Responsive Wealthy Claimants Yes 
Benefits for Infra-marginal Wealthy Claimants Yes 
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 Even so, an income-based cap can weaken work incentives by reducing the purchasing-power of marginal 
earnings, as discussed above.  See supra Part II.C.1.b.  For example, assume someone wants to use their last dollar 
of earnings to contribute to charity, but the cap disallows this deduction.  In this case, the purchasing power of this 
marginal dollar of earnings – and thus the return to working more – is reduced. 
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Excess Burden  
Increased Complexity  Yes 
Increased Cost for Favored Activity Yes 
Bracket Creep Yes 
Disguised Rate Increase No 
Spreading Yes 
Bunching No 
Distribution  
Disproportionate Cuts for Wealthy Claimants No 
Mitigated “Upside Down” Effect No 
Cost-Effective Externalities for Low-Income 
3
rd
 Parties 
No 
 
E. Phaseouts and Cliffs 
Phaseouts and cliffs deny tax benefits to those who earn more than a minimum amount.  
The disallowance occurs all at once with a cliff, and over a range with a phaseout.  Under current 
law, phaseouts apply to the earned income-tax credit, child credit, Roth IRAs, and various 
education credits.  
1. Programmatic Incentives 
 These limits preserve programmatic incentives for taxpayers with sufficiently low 
incomes, while eliminating them for everyone else.  As a result, phaseouts and cliffs avoid 
subsidizing what (some) claimants would do anyway.  High-income claimants need less 
encouragement to enter the workforce, seek an education, and save for retirement.  Excluding 
these claimants can focus the subsidy where it has the most impact.  Indeed, when the goal is to 
encourage at least a minimum level of favored activity (e.g., so claimants become self-
sufficient), a phaseout can be paired with a cap, as with education subsidies, the EITC, and Roth 
IRAs under current law.   
 At the same time, phaseouts and cliffs are not a good fit for maximizing the volume of 
activity, without regard to who engages in it.  For instance, phasing out the charitable deduction 
for high-earners would significantly reduce charitable giving, since these donors have more 
capacity to give and are more responsive to financial incentives.   
2. Excess Burden 
Phaseouts and cliffs also increase the effective marginal tax rate.
152
  Earning more causes 
taxpayers to lose deductions, exclusions, or credits.
153
  The EITC thus creates offsetting 
incentives: the credit itself encourages work, but the phaseout has the opposite effect. 
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 Manning & Andress, supra note 23, at 1592 (“A phase-out of a deduction is effectively the same as an 
adjustment of the tax rate for those otherwise entitled to the deduction.”). 
153
 Daniel N. Shaviro, Effective Marginal Tax Rates on Low-Income Households, 84 TAX NOTES 1191, 1196 (Aug. 
23, 1999) (estimating effective marginal rate of over 100% in increasing income from $10,000 to $25,000, given 
phaseout of various state and federal welfare and other benefits, such as Medicaid, the EITC, Temporary Aid to 
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3. Distribution 
Even so, phaseouts and cliffs can promote distributional goals, especially when tax 
expenditures generate mostly private benefits.  For instance, since the EITC is supposed to help 
claimants, a phaseout enhances distribution by ensuring they actually need this assistance.  In 
contrast, the charitable deduction helps third-party beneficiaries more than claimants.  When 
these beneficiaries have low incomes, phasing out this subsidy is a counterproductive way to 
pursue distributional goals.  
4. Tradeoffs 
Phaseouts and cliffs offer a familiar tradeoff between programmatic benefits and 
distribution, on one hand, and excess burden, on the other.  These limits permit precise income-
based allocations.  This can focus the subsidy where it does the most good, especially when 
subsidies generate private benefits.  For these individually-based tax expenditures, the main 
disadvantage is that phaseouts and cliffs increase effective marginal rates.  They also are a poor 
fit for aggregate subsidies that increase the overall amount of favored activity, without regard to 
who engages in it. 
   Table 5: Phaseouts and Cliffs 
Programmatic Benefits  
Benefits for High Activity Levels With 
Valuable Externalities 
Yes (in theory)
154
 
Benefits for High Activity Levels With 
Diminishing Returns 
Yes (in theory) 
Benefits for Essential First Dollar Yes 
Benefits for Infra-marginal First Dollar Yes 
Benefits for Responsive Wealthy Claimants No 
Benefits for Infra-marginal Wealthy Claimants No 
Excess Burden  
Increased Complexity  Yes 
Increased Cost for Favored Activity Yes 
Bracket Creep Yes 
Disguised Rate Increase Yes 
Spreading No 
Bunching No 
Distribution  
Disproportionate Cuts for Wealthy Claimants Yes 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Needy Families, food stamps, and rent subsidies); Manning & Andress, supra note 23, at 1593 (“Because all 
exemptions are phased out simultaneously, possibly reflecting the practical difficulties of doing it seriatim with such 
a large rante, this process also has the perverse effect that the larger the family, the harder the marginal rate 
throughout the phaseout range.  Talk about negative family values.”); id at 1598 (“to the extent high tax rates 
discourage work, the EITC phase-out may have a perverse effect”). 
154
 A phaseout becomes a tighter constraint as income rises, but not as activity level rises.  On their own, then, 
phaseouts do not limit the amount of activity that is subsidized.  But they usually are paired with caps, so it is rare 
for a tax expenditure that is subject to a phaseout to support an unlimited level of activity.  Even if they did, 
moreover, the low-income of the claimant would itself constrain how much favored activity is feasible. 
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Mitigated “Upside Down” Effect Yes 
Cost-Effective Externalities for Low-Income 
3
rd
 Parties 
No 
 
F. Maximum Fraction 
Another option is to fund an unlimited amount of the favored activity, but at a lower rate.  
For example, although the taxpayer’s marginal rate usually defines the government’s share of 
deductions and exclusions, President Obama has proposed a maximum of 28% (“a maximum 
fraction”).   
1. Programmatic Incentives 
This proposal affects only those in brackets above 28%.  It weakens their programmatic 
incentives, but does not eliminate them.  A key question is whether this reduced rate induces the 
desired level of favored activity.  The answer varies with the context.  All else being equal, the 
rate should be higher when activities generate more externalities.  At the same time, it should be 
lower when claimants are more responsive to tax incentives.   
A flaw in the Obama proposal, then, is that 28% is unlikely to be right for all tax 
expenditures.  Current law has a similar flaw in using the marginal tax rate as the reimbursement 
rate (for deductions and exclusions).
155
  There is no reason why the marginal tax rate (or 28% 
percent) always would be optimal.
156
  Instead, we should use different rates for mortgage 
interest, health insurance, charity, and other subsidies.
157
  To do so, we can use credits with rates 
tailored to the context.  Admittedly, this approach has its own problems.  This tailoring raises 
administrative costs.  The government may also not have the expertise to distinguish among 
different subsidies, and will face intense lobbying in doing so.  Yet even if the result is not 
perfect, there is room to improve on current law. 
A further downside is that a maximum fraction accords the same treatment to the first and 
last dollar spent on favored activity, even if the relevant elasticities or externalities vary.  As a 
result, this limit is more likely than a floor to subsidize what claimants would do anyway (such 
as the first dollar of charity).  Unlike a cap, it subsidizes an unlimited amount of favored activity, 
which is undesirable when marginal externalities decline (as with gold-plated health insurance).    
2. Excess Burden 
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 Admittedly, there might be some correlation.  For instance, tax sensitive people may be more responsive not only 
in their labor supply decisions, but also in their use of tax expenditures.  Cf. Joel Slemrod & Wojciech Kopczuk, The 
Optimal Elasticity of Taxable Income 84 J. PUB. ECON. 91 (2002) (positing that elasticity may be controllable 
instead of a pure preference).  If all else were equal, then, we would want lower rates – both tax rates and subsidy 
rates – for those who are especially tax sensitive.  Yet even for them, we should be concerned that elasticities of 
labor supply differ from those for subsidized activities, such that the rates should be different. 
156
 See Saez, supra note 12, at 2659 (“There is no theoretical reason to link the subsidy rate on the contribution good 
to the income tax rate as is currently done in the US income tax code.”).  Batchelder, Goldberg, Orszag, supra note 
8, at 28 (“It is extremely unlikely that externalities and elasticities change in an abrupt and discontinuous fashion 
exactly at the point of zero income tax liability or the marginal tax rate thresholds.”).   
157
 In other work, I have discussed the potential advantages of this approach for charitable subsidies.  Schizer, 
Subsidizing Charitable Contributions, supra note 17. 
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Like other limits, a maximum fraction can complicate the calculation of tax liability, 
although tax preparation software alleviates this cost.  Even so, a maximum fraction has an 
advantage over caps and floors: it does not create an incentive to shift spending from one year to 
another.  Under the Obama proposal, each dollar of deductions is worth 28 cents, whether we 
concentrate two years of deductions into a single year or spread them evenly across both years.  
In other words, a maximum fraction avoids the “bunching” and “spreading” associated with 
floors and caps.
158
       
 
A maximum fraction differs from caps and floors in another respect as well: it does not 
disallow (or authorize) more deductions as claimant earns more.  For instance, by earning 
another dollar, and thus moving from the 28% bracket to the 33% bracket, claimants do not lose 
any deductions.  As a result, a maximum fraction does not change the effective marginal rate in 
the way that income-based floors and caps do.  Yet a maximum fraction obviously makes some 
deductions less valuable than they otherwise would be.  As a result, this limit increases the cost 
of previously-subsidized consumption.
159
  It also imposes a form of bracket creep, since 
claimants can no longer use itemized deductions to avoid moving from the 28% bracket to the 
33% bracket.
160
   
3. Distribution 
A maximum fraction can enhance distribution by offering a more uniform tax benefit to 
claimants with different incomes.  Under President Obama’s proposal, for instance, claimants in 
the 28% bracket receive the same tax benefit as claimants in higher brackets.  Put another way, a 
maximum fraction disallows more tax benefits for those in higher bracket (e.g., the Obama 
proposal disallows 11.6% in the 39.6% bracket, but only 7% in the 35% bracket).  Even so, 
claimants in lower brackets still receive a less generous tax benefit.  A dollar of deductions is 
still worth 15 cents to claimants the 15% bracket, but its value becomes the same 28 cents for 
claimants in the 28%, 35% and 39.6% brackets.  As a result, the “upside down effect” is 
mitigated but not eliminated.   
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 For similar reasons, it also avoids the incentive to “spread,” discussed above, that can arise even without a cap: 
“bunching” can move claimants to a lower bracket, thereby reducing the value of deductions or exclusions.  Yet the 
Obama proposal eliminates this issue for claimants in the top three brackets.  Whether they stay in their current 
bracket or move to a lower one, their deductions and exclusions are still worth 28%.  This value declines only if they 
move to a bracket below 28%. 
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 For example, if someone wants to use their last dollar of earnings to pay mortgage interest, but a maximum 
fraction reduces the tax benefit, the purchasing power of this marginal dollar of earnings – and thus the return to 
working more – is reduced.  See supra Part II.C.1.b.   
160
 Taxpayers have to determine their tax bracket based on their income before they subtract their itemized 
deductions (i.e., using adjusted gross income instead of taxable income).  For example, since the 33% bracket 
applies to income above $183,250, consider a taxpayer who has an adjusted gross income (“AGI”) of exactly this 
$183,250 amount, and also has $10,000 of itemized deductions.  Under current law, an additional dollar of earnings 
is still taxed at 28%.  The reason is that brackets are not applied to AGI (the pre-deduction amount), but to taxable 
income (i.e., AGI minus itemized deductions). This means deductions can keep taxpayers from moving up to the 
33% bracket: AGI is 183,251, but taxable income (i.e., AGI minus $10,000 of itemized deductions) is only 
$173,251.  As a result, a dollar of deductions is reducing tax by 33 cents – something that President Obama’s 
proposal does not allow.  Instead of applying the brackets after subtracting deductions, we would apply the brackets 
to AGI, calculate the tax, and then separately subtract an amount equal to 28% of the itemized deductions (28% of 
10,000 or 2800). 
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Again, the distributional analysis becomes more complicated if we focus on economic 
benefits, instead of tax benefits.  By cutting the reimbursement rate, maximum fractions can 
reduce the volume of favored activity.  This has an adverse effect on low-income third parties 
who benefit from it (e.g., charity to soup kitchens).  
4. Tradeoffs 
A maximum fraction is, in a sense, a compromise between floors and caps.  Instead of 
preserving programmatic incentives for high levels of activity (like floors), or eliminating them 
(like caps), a maximum fraction preserves them, but at a reduced level.  This limit’s effects on 
excess burden and distribution are comparably moderate.  A maximum fraction does not 
encourage bunching or spreading, or alter effective marginal rates in the way that an income-
based floor or caps does.  Although a maximum fraction targets only high-income taxpayers 
(e.g., above the 28% bracket in the Obama proposal), it does not eliminate their subsidy (as 
phaseouts do).  Likewise, this limit mitigates the “upside down” effect, but does not eliminate 
it.
161
  
    Table 6: Maximum Fraction 
Programmatic Benefits  
Benefits for High Activity Levels With 
Valuable Externalities 
Yes (but reduced) 
Benefits for High Activity Levels With 
Diminishing Returns 
Yes (but reduced) 
Benefits for Essential First Dollar Yes (but reduced) 
Benefits for Infra-marginal First Dollar Yes (but reduced) 
Benefits for Responsive Wealthy Claimants Yes (but reduced) 
Benefits for Infra-marginal Wealthy Claimants Yes (but reduced) 
Excess Burden  
Increased Complexity  Yes 
Increased Cost for Favored Activity Yes 
Bracket Creep Yes 
Disguised Rate Increase No 
Spreading No 
Bunching No 
Distribution  
Disproportionate Cuts for Wealthy Claimants Yes 
Mitigated “Upside Down” Effect Yes 
Cost-Effective Externalities for Low-Income 
3
rd
 Parties 
Yes 
 
G. Haircuts 
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 In a simulation, Toder, Rosenberg and Eng raise $82 billion with a 19.2% rate-based fraction, concluding that 
89% of the impact is on the top 20%, and 41.4% is on the top 1%: this is significantly more progressive than a 
haircut and an income-based limit, but less progressive than a fixed-dollar limit. 
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Finally, instead of setting a maximum tax benefit for a favored expense (e.g., 28 cents per 
dollar), we can disallow a fixed percentage of it.  Under current law, for instance, only 50% of 
business-related entertainment expenses can be deducted.  A similar “haircut” can be applied to 
any deduction, exclusion, or credit.  For example, we can exclude only 50% of health insurance 
premiums funded by employers.
162
    
1. Programmatic Incentives 
 Like maximum fractions, haircuts weaken programmatic incentives, but do not eliminate 
them.  A haircut is useful, then, when the marginal reimbursement rate would otherwise be too 
high.  This can be true when claimants are especially responsive, so a lower subsidy still offers 
sufficient motivation.  In addition, a subsidy generally should equal the marginal positive 
externalities it generates.  If another dollar of mortgage interest generates only ten cents of 
positive externalities, the marginal subsidy should be 10%.  A haircut can bring us closer to this 
optimal level. 
 It would be cleaner, though, to use a credit that specifies the rate we want.  With this 
approach, we do not need a haircut.  After all, if we want the subsidy to be 20%, we can simply 
use a 20% credit, instead of a 40% credit with a 50% haircut.  In contrast, with deductions and 
exclusions, a uniform haircut generates a different reimbursement rate in each bracket.  For 
example, a 50% haircut creates a 17.5% reimbursement rate in the 35% bracket, but only a 7.5% 
reimbursement rate in the 15% bracket.  Just as the marginal tax rates themselves are unlikely to 
be optimal for a given subsidy, fractions of these rates also are unlikely to be optimal.   To get 
the right reimbursement rate in one bracket, we need a haircut that could yield the wrong rate in 
another bracket.  In theory, we could use different haircuts in different brackets but, again, it is 
more straightforward to use a credit with the rate schedule we want. 
Haircuts have another limitation as well: they offer the same subsidy for low and high 
activity levels.  In this way, haircuts resemble maximum fractions and differ starkly from caps 
and floors.  As a result, haircuts risk subsidizing what claimants would do anyway (e.g., the first 
dollar of charity), or funding high levels of activity that yield fewer marginal externalities (e.g., 
gold-plated health insurance).  
2.   Excess Burden 
This difference between haircuts, on one hand, and caps and floors, on the other, means 
these limits affect excess burden in different ways as well.  For example, income-based caps 
authorize more deductions as claimants earn more.  Yet haircuts do not reduce the effective 
marginal tax rate in this way.  By earning more, a claimant cannot somehow turn a 50% haircut 
into a 30% haircut.   
If anything, haircuts become a tighter constraint as claimants earn more.  Since 
deductions and exclusions offer more generous tax benefits in higher brackets, the tax benefit 
disallowed by a haircut becomes more valuable as claimants earn more.  For example, losing 
                                                          
162
 The alternative minimum tax also is a haircut of sorts, although the fraction disallowed varies with a number of 
factors, including the AMT and regular marginal tax rates, as well the amount of tax preferences the taxpayer has.    
For a discussion, see Hines & Logue, supra note 3. 
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50% of the mortgage interest deduction costs more in the 39.6% bracket than in the 15% bracket 
(19.8 cents versus 7.5 cents per dollar).   
In imposing a heavier burden on high income claimants, then, haircuts are more like 
income-based floors, which disallow more deductions as claimants earn more.  Yet floors and 
haircuts are by no means the same.  While haircuts become more burdensome as taxpayers move 
to a higher bracket, they accord the same treatment to claimants in the same bracket.  Income-
based floors, by contrast, differentiate even among claimants in the same bracket.  For example, 
assume a claimant in the top bracket (earning $500,000) contributes $50,000 to charity, and is 
subject either to a 10% haircut or a 1% floor.  Each limit would disallow $5,000 of charitable 
deductions, raising the tax bill by $1,980.  But what happens if the claimant earns an additional 
$1,000?  The income-based floor would disallow another $10 of deductions, raising tax by $3.96.  
In contrast, nothing changes with the haircut, which still disallows $5,000 of deductions.  Like 
maximum fractions, then, haircuts do not change the effective marginal rate in this way.     
Similarly, haircuts do not encourage “bunching” or “spreading” in the same way that 
floors and caps do.  A haircut disallows the same percentage of deductions, whether they are 
concentrated in a single year or spread across multiple years.  Unlike with a floor (or cap), this 
percentage cannot be reduced by concentrating (or spreading) deductions.  In the example above, 
the claimant can reduce the percentage of deductions she loses under the 1% floor – from 10% to 
5% -- by contributing $100,000 in a single year, instead of $50,000 this year and $50,000 next 
year.
163
  Yet under the 10% haircut, she loses 10% either way.
164
 
Notwithstanding these differences, haircuts share three effects on excess burden with all 
the limits discussed so far.  First, like these other limits, a haircut can increase the after-tax cost 
of favored activity, thereby influencing work and savings choices.
165
   Second, in disallowing a 
portion of a claimant’s deductions or exclusions, a haircut can move claimants into a higher tax 
bracket.
166
  (Limits on credits do not have this effect, as discussed above.)  Third, any limit can 
complicate the calculation of tax liability, although tax preparation software alleviates this 
concern.   
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 If she contributes $50,000 each year, she loses 1% of her income (or $5,000) in both years, for a total of $10,000.  
But if she contributes $100,000 in one year, she loses only $5000 in that year, and 0 in the next year. 
164
 She either loses $10,000 in a single year (on the $100,000 contribution), or $5000 each year (on the two $50,000 
contributions).  As noted above, bunching can have the disadvantage of bringing a taxpayer into a lower bracket, so 
the value of the deduction is reduced.  This effect, which is different from the one described in the text, endures 
under a haircut, but in somewhat diminished form (since the haircut reduces the deduction’s value anyway). 
165
 For example, if someone wants to use their last dollar of earnings to pay mortgage interest, but a maximum 
fraction reduces the tax benefit, the purchasing power of this marginal dollar of earnings – and thus the return to 
working more – is reduced.  See supra Part II.C.1.b.   
166
 Taxpayers have to determine their tax bracket based on their income before they subtract their itemized 
deductions (i.e., using adjusted gross income instead of taxable income).  For example, since the 33% bracket 
applies to income above $183,250, consider a taxpayer who has an adjusted gross income (“AGI”) of exactly this 
$183,250 amount, and also has $10,000 of itemized deductions.  Under current law, an additional dollar of earnings 
is still taxed at 28%.  The reason is that brackets are not applied to AGI (the pre-deduction amount), but to taxable 
income (i.e., AGI minus itemized deductions). This means deductions can keep taxpayers from moving up to the 
33% bracket: AGI is 183,251, but taxable income (i.e., AGI minus $10,000 of itemized deductions) is only 
$173,251.  As a result, a dollar of deductions is reducing tax by 33 cents – something that President Obama’s 
proposal does not allow.  Instead of applying the brackets after subtracting deductions, we would apply the brackets 
to AGI, calculate the tax, and then separately subtract an amount equal to 28% of the itemized deductions (28% of 
10,000 or 2800). 
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3. Distribution 
Unlike maximum fractions, which focus on higher brackets, haircuts apply to all 
brackets.  They differ from maximum fractions, then, in reducing tax benefits claimed by low-
income claimants.  Even so, a haircut has more impact on high-bracket claimants, since their 
deductions and exclusions – and, therefore, the fraction disallowed by a haircut – are worth 
more.  For example, a 50% haircut on a dollar of deductions costs 17.5 cents in the 35% bracket 
but only 14 cents in the 28% bracket.  Thus, although a haircut preserves the so-called “upside 
down” effect – since tax benefits still correlate with the marginal tax rate – it burdens high-
income claimants more for the same reason. 
Again, the distributional analysis becomes more complicated if we focus on economic 
benefits, instead of tax benefits.  Like maximum fractions, haircuts cut the marginal 
reimbursement rate.  This can lower the level of favored activity, which (in some cases) will 
eliminate externalities benefitting low-income people. 
4. Tradeoffs 
Like maximum fractions, haircuts also carve out a middle position between floors and 
caps.  They reduce programmatic incentives without eliminating them.  In addition, haircuts do 
not encourage “bunching” or “spreading,” or affect the marginal tax rate, in the way income-
based floors and caps do.  Unlike maximum fractions, though, haircuts apply to all brackets.  
Even so, the deductions and exclusions they partially disallow are worth more in higher 
brackets.
167
   
    Table 7: Haircuts 
Programmatic Benefits  
Benefits for High Activity Levels With 
Valuable Externalities 
Yes (but reduced) 
Benefits for High Activity Levels With 
Diminishing Returns 
Yes (but reduced) 
Benefits for Essential First Dollar Yes (but reduced) 
Benefits for Infra-marginal First Dollar Yes (but reduced) 
Benefits for Responsive Wealthy Claimants Yes (but reduced) 
Benefits for Infra-marginal Wealthy Claimants Yes (but reduced) 
Excess Burden  
Increased Complexity  Yes 
Increased Cost for Favored Activity Yes 
Bracket Creep Yes 
Disguised Rate Increase Yes (in a sense)
168
 
Spreading No 
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 Toder, Rosenberg and Eng raise $82 billion with a 29.5% haircut, and find that 71.7% of the impact is on the top 
20% (compared with 67.1% for an income-based cap and 90.8% for a fixed dollar cap).  They estimate that 24.9% 
comes from the top 1% (compared with 22.1% for an income-based cap and 60.4% for a fixed dollar cap). 
168
 By earning more, and thus moving to a higher bracket, a claimant loses a portion of a more valuable deduction, 
as noted above.  Yet unlike income-based floors and phaseouts, haircuts do not increase the effective marginal rate 
of claimants who stay in the same bracket.   
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Bunching No 
Distribution  
Disproportionate Cuts for Wealthy Claimants Yes 
Mitigated “Upside Down” Effect No 
Cost-Effective Externalities for Low-Income 
3
rd
 Parties 
Yes 
 
IV. Implications: “Grand Slam” Opportunities, Tradeoffs, and the Value of 
Context-Specific Tailoring 
 
A.  Grand Slam Opportunities 
 In some cases, when we limit a tax expenditure, all our goals align.  We can save money 
while preserving programmatic benefits, mitigating excess burden, and enhancing distribution.  
This Article identifies two circumstances in which these “grand slam” situations arise.  In the 
first, programmatic benefits are not worth preserving.  This can be true if a tax expenditure 
pursues unwise goals or, for that matter, if it pursues valuable goals ineffectively.   
 In the second “grand slam” scenario, programmatic benefits are valuable, but only at low 
activity levels.  Depending on the relevant empirics, subsidized health insurance, retirement 
savings, and mortgage interest could all involve declining marginal externalities, as discussed 
above.  If this is the case, caps can saves money while largely preserving programmatic benefits.  
Admittedly, caps can add to compliance costs and also can increase effective marginal tax rates 
in some ways (e.g., bracket creep).  But unlike phaseouts and income-based floors, caps are not 
mathematically equivalent to a rate increase; on the contrary, income based-caps reduce effective 
marginal tax rates.  Caps also improve distribution if they disproportionately burden high-income 
taxpayers.  This may be true of  caps on health insurance, retirement savings, and mortgage 
interest, as discussed above.  After all, high-income claimants disproportionately claim these tax 
expenditures, although in some cases low-income people also benefit from externalities 
generated by these tax expenditures.  In any event, when a tax expenditure satisfies these various 
empirical parameters, capping it can save revenue, enhance progressivity, and preserve valuable 
externalities, while adding only modestly to excess burden.   
B. Tradeoffs and the Value of Context-Specific Tailoring  
Yet in other cases, there is tension among our competing goals.  As Part III showed, 
various limits strike different balances among programmatic benefits, excess burden, and 
distribution.  The table below summarizes the diverse effects of the seven limits analyzed in Part 
III.   
All of these limits have four common effects: first, they raise revenue; second, they 
increase the after-tax cost of the favored activity; third, they can move a claimant into a higher 
tax bracket; fourth, they add complexity to the tax system by introducing another rule that must 
be understood and enforced, although some of these limits can also have the offsetting effect of 
simplifying the law (e.g., as floors do in eliminating the need for record-keeping).   
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Yet despite these commonalities, these limits are quite different.  Some affect 
programmatic benefits by eliminating the subsidy for high activity levels (fixed-dollar caps and 
income-based caps).  In contrast, other limits do not change the subsidy for high activity levels 
(fixed-dollar floors and income-based floors), and still others preserve it in weakened form 
(maximum fractions and haircuts).  Likewise, some limits withhold the subsidy for the first 
dollar of activity (e.g., income-based floors and fixed-dollar floors), but others maintain it (fixed-
dollar caps and income based caps).  Again, others weaken but do not eliminate it (maximum 
fractions and haircuts).  As a result, these various limits allow us to fine tune programmatic 
incentive, inducing the desired effects more cost-effectively.  At the same time, if the incentive is 
too nuanced or complex – so it becomes incomprehensible – it cannot motivate claimants 
effectively. 
These limits also affect excess burden in different ways.  Some are mathematically 
equivalent to a cut in the marginal tax rate (income-based caps), or to an increase in the marginal 
tax rate (income-based floors, phaseouts, and arguably haircuts as well); in contrast, others do 
not influence the effective marginal tax rate in this way (fixed-dollar caps, fixed-dollar floors, 
and maximum fractions).  Some limits encourage bunching (income-based floors and fixed 
dollar floors) or spreading (income-based caps and fixed dollar caps), and others do not have 
either of these effects (phaseouts, maximum fractions, and haircuts).    
Needless to say, these limits also affect distribution in different ways. Some deny the 
subsidy to high-income claimants (phaseouts) or otherwise disproportionately reduce their tax 
benefits (fixed dollar caps, maximum fractions, and haircuts), while others do not (income-based 
floors, fixed-dollar floors, and income-based caps).    
   Table 8: The Diverse Effects of Seven Different Limits 
 Fixed-
Dollar 
Floors 
Income-
Based 
Floors 
Fixed-
Dollar 
Caps 
Income-
Based 
Caps 
Phaseouts 
and Cliffs 
Maximum 
Fractions 
Haircuts 
Programmatic Benefits        
Benefits for High 
Activity Levels With 
Valuable Externalities 
Yes Yes No No Yes (in 
theory) 
Yes (but 
reduced) 
Yes (but 
reduced) 
Benefits for High 
Activity Levels With 
Diminishing Returns 
Yes Yes No No Yes (in 
theory) 
Yes (but 
reduced) 
Yes (but 
reduced) 
Benefits for Essential 
First Dollar 
No No Yes Yes Yes Yes (but 
reduced) 
Yes (but 
reduced) 
Benefits for Infra-
marginal First Dollar 
No No Yes Yes Yes Yes (but 
reduced) 
Yes (but 
reduced) 
Benefits for Responsive 
Wealthy Claimants 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes (but 
reduced) 
Yes (but 
reduced) 
Benefits for Infra-
marginal Wealthy 
Claimants 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes (but 
reduced) 
Yes (but 
reduced) 
Excess Burden        
Increased Complexity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Increased Cost for 
Favored Activity 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bracket Creep Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Disguised Rate Increase Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes (in a 
sense) 
Spreading No No Yes Yes No No No 
Bunching Yes Yes No No No No No 
Distribution        
Disproportionate Cuts 
for Wealthy Claimants 
No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Mitigated “Upside 
Down” Effect 
No No No No Yes Yes No 
Cost-Effective 
Externalities for Low-
Income 3
rd
 Parties 
Yes Yes No No No Yes (but 
reduced) 
Yes (but 
reduced) 
 
Since each limit involves a different mix of tradeoffs, we should pick the limit (or 
combination of limits) that is the best fit for a particular tax expenditure.  For example, a 
phaseout has the advantage of focusing a subsidy on those who most need it, but the 
disadvantage of raising effective marginal rates.  This balance of benefits and costs is more 
plausible for subsidies that generate private benefits, such as the EITC.  It is less appealing for 
subsidies that generate externalities for low-income claimants, such as charity for soup kitchens. 
Likewise, a well-crafted floor on the charitable deduction can save money while (largely) 
preserving incentives to give.  Yet floors also trigger welfare costs.  Since the mix of costs varies 
for different floors, we need to pick our poison.  For example, a fixed-dollar floor has the 
disadvantage of not adjusting to a claimant’s giving capacity.  But it has the offsetting advantage 
of not raising the effective marginal rate in the way income-based floors do.  Likewise, if we set 
the floor at a low level, we save less money and subsidize more infra-marginal contributions.  
But a higher floor triggers more bunching.  High floors also keep us from motivating donors 
whose marginal contributions would be below the floor.  We need to weigh these competing 
effects in order to choose the right limit. 
As these examples illustrate, we should tailor each limit to the context, since every tax 
expenditure involves a different mix of externalities and elasticities.  For similar reasons, we may 
also want a different marginal reimbursement rate for each tax expenditure.  While 
administrative and information costs limit how much tailoring we can do, the right number is 
unlikely to be the marginal tax rate,
169
 as discussed above.
170
   
In setting marginal reimbursement rates, and also in crafting limits, we also should 
remember that the relevant facts can change.  Over the past thirty years, for example, many tax 
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 See Saez, supra note 12, at 2659 (“There is no theoretical reason to link the subsidy rate on the contribution good 
to the income tax rate as is currently done in the US income tax code.”).  Batchelder, Goldberg, Orszag, supra note 
8, at 28 (“It is extremely unlikely that externalities and elasticities change in an abrupt and discontinuous fashion 
exactly at the point of zero income tax liability or the marginal tax rate thresholds.”).   
170
 Admittedly, there might be some correlation.  For instance, tax sensitive people may be more responsive not only 
in their labor supply decisions, but also in their use of tax expenditures.  Cf. Joel Slemrod & Wojciech Kopczuk, The 
Optimal Elasticity of Taxable Income 84 J. PUB. ECON. 91 (2002) (positing that elasticity may be controllable 
instead of a pure preference).  If all else were equal, then, we would want lower rates – both tax rates and subsidy 
rates – for those who are especially tax sensitive.  Yet even for them, we should be concerned that elasticities of 
labor supply differ from those for subsidized activities, such that the rates should be different. 
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expenditures have stopped providing tax benefits to middle- and low-income claimants; the 
reason, noted above, is that marginal tax rates have been cut so substantially.  Like distributional 
impact, other key variables can change as well, such as programmatic benefits and administrative 
costs.  When the essential facts change, we may also need to adjust the limit or the marginal 
reimbursement rate (or both).  We have reason, then, to reevaluate these issues periodically.    
C. Basket Limits  
 The value of context-specific tailoring has another implication: we should be skeptical of 
basket limits.  Although they may be good politics, as discussed above, they are not usually good 
policy.
171
  The problem is that baskets are clumsy way to calibrate the level of favored activity.  
To see why, assume a subsidy of X induces the optimal level of health insurance, while Y induces 
the optimal level of retirement savings.  What happens if we set a single basket limit, X + Y, for 
these two activities combined?  A taxpayer can spend all of X & Y on health insurance and 
nothing on retirement savings, or vice versa.    
 Given the blunt incentives they create, basket limits are not easy to justify (setting 
politics aside).  One potential rationale is that they allow taxpayers to choose the tax 
expenditures they value the most.  Yet choice is counterproductive if it undercuts the purpose of 
the limit.  For example, if we do not want to subsidize the first dollar of charity, a floor that can 
be met with other deductions does not keep the first charitable dollar from being subsidized.
172
 
Alternatively, the advantage of basket limits may be that claimants are less likely to 
notice them.  If so, the government may be able to change behavior on the cheap, inducing 
favored activity without actually paying for it.  Yet claimants presumably will notice eventually; 
they could be tipped off, for example, by advisors, media coverage, or unexpectedly high tax 
bills.  When they realize their error, claimants could start worrying about hidden traps in other 
subsidies (even when there are none).  This erosion of trust could make it harder, and more 
expensive, to motivate them again.      
Finally, the case for basket limits may lie in administrative savings.  With baskets, we 
avoid the cost of crafting multiple limits, and of policing the lines among different tax 
expenditures.  Even so, it does not seem especially difficult to craft a separate limit for each tax 
expenditure, or to determine whether a payment is mortgage interest instead of charity.
173
  At the 
same time, any administrative savings we reap comes at a cost: baskets can warp the relevant 
incentives, as noted above.  As a result, it seems unlikely that the administrative savings from 
baskets routinely offsets the programmatic costs of having blunter incentives.  Yet like so many 
issues in this Article, this is an empirical question that should be resolved with context-specific 
analysis. 
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 Toder, Rosenberg, Eng, supra note 21, at 5 (“across the board limits on spending . . . may make it politically 
easier to sustain spending cuts.  Overall limits on spending or tax expenditures are suboptimal ways to reduce 
deficits because they equally cut high-value and low-value activities.  No well-functioning organization, either 
private or governmental, would reduce its costs in this manner.” “And if tax expenditures more often than not 
misallocate resources, overall limits on them could yield net improvement in the tax system and budgetary policy, 
even while falling far short of the ideal.”). 
172
 For example, the Pease rule’s 3% floor can be met with state income taxes. 
173
 Kaplow, Standard Deduction, supra note 117, at 28 (noting that policing the lines among tax expenditures is not 
difficult). 
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D. Empirical Research 
Needless to say, the centrality of empirical questions is a recurring theme in this Article.   
Since empirical research on the right questions can add a lot of value, the Treasury should devote 
more resources to this research.  It also should provide more data to academic partners, and can 
consider grants and other support as well. 
E. Should Benefits Vary By Income?  A Response to Batchelder, Goldberg and 
Orszag 
The importance of context has still another implication: when externalities and elasticity 
vary systematically with income, the marginal reimbursement rate should vary as well.  
However, Lily Batchelder, Fred Goldberg and Peter Orszag resist this sort of income-based 
tailoring, at least as a general matter.  Instead, they recommend using refundable credits as a 
default practice, so the same marginal reimbursement rate applies to everyone.
174
  They accept 
income-based variation only based on “specific knowledge that [high income] households are 
more responsive to the incentive or that engaging in the behavior generates larger social 
benefits”175  But this is the exception, not the rule.  In defending uniformity as a default, they 
ground their argument in efficiency.  They claim that uniformity minimizes the risk of large 
errors, and thus reduces distortions, which are a function of the square of errors.
176
   
Default rules are more appealing, though, if they are correct most of the time.  As a 
result, a key question is how often elasticities and externalities vary with income.  Batchelder, 
Goldberg and Orszag’s proposal is more compelling if these variations are rare.  Yet there are 
many reasons why these variables often would vary with income.  For example, if the goal of a 
subsidy is to provide private benefits, subsidizing low-income claimants usually is preferable.  
The same is true if the goal is to encourage self-sufficiency, for instance, by encouraging 
claimants to enter the workforce, buy health insurance, or save for retirement.  Since high-
income claimants are likely to take these steps on their own, more externalities are generated in 
focusing on low-income claimants. In contrast, instead of targeting those who are most in need, 
we sometimes target those who are most responsive.  In these cases, we have reason to focus on 
high-income claimants.  Whether these scenarios are typical or unusual is, of course, an 
empirical question.  This Articles does not seek to resolve it definitively.  Yet there certainly are 
a number of contexts were externalities and elasticities do vary with income. 
Even so, Batchelder, Goldberg and Orszag offer another argument for uniformity: even if 
elasticity and externalities do vary with income, uniformity is better if we are unsure how they 
vary.  Nevertheless, this argument is persuasive only if we have no idea whether to subsidize 
low- or high-income claimants.  Batchelder, Goldberg and Orszag rely on just such an example.  
They assume a ten cent subsidy should be given either to a high-income group (H) or a low-
income group (L), and we have no sense of which is more likely.  On these facts, Batchelder, 
Goldberg and Orszag show that giving five cents to each group (a certain error of five each time) 
minimizes deadweight loss: five cents, after all, is the mean of the possible outcomes (i.e., ten or 
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 Batchelder, Goldberg &Orszag, supra note 8, at 27 n.16(the “default assumption” should be that “underlying 
price elasticities and behavior do not vary systematically across income distribution”). 
175
 Id. at 24. 
176
 Batchelder, Goldberg and Orszag ground their case in efficiency, rather than in distribution.  See generally  
Batchelder, Goldberg & Orszag, supra note 8, at 47-48. 
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zero).
177
  But the key assumption in their example – the reason why uniformity is the error-
minimizing default – is that H and L are equally plausible.   
However, this analysis no longer holds when we have at least some sense of which 
income cohort should be funded.  In this case, uniformity no longer minimizes distortions.  For 
instance, assume L should get more of the subsidy, but we don’t know how much more.  There is 
a 50% chance that 75% should go to L and 25% should go to H.  There also is a 50% chance that 
all should go to L.  On these facts, uniformity (5 and 5) does not minimize errors
178
 or 
deadweight loss.
179
   Instead, it is better to split the difference between the most likely scenarios 
(8.75 and 1.25).
180
  Accordingly, when we are able to make even a rough guess, the default 
should not be uniformity, but context-specific tailoring.  If externalities and elasticity might vary 
with income, but we are not sure how, we should use our best estimate of the relevant facts.  A 
probability-weighted mean of likely outcomes minimizes the square of deviations.
181
   
Admittedly, this “best estimate” approach is not helpful if the relevant elasticities and 
externalities are a complete mystery.  If even a ballpark estimate is impossible, Batchelder, 
Goldberg, and Orszag’s argument for uniformity has force.  But if we truly have no idea, does a 
subsidy really make sense?  Before committing scarce resources, we should have at least a rough 
prediction of a subsidy’s effects.  Otherwise, how can conclude that it is cost-justified?  Once 
this sort of prediction is feasible, uniformity is no longer the efficient answer.
182
   
Of course, there may be other reasons to favor uniformity, such as a social welfare 
function that especially values equal treatment in the relevant setting.  But if we seek to promote 
equality more generally – whether to reduce income inequality or to promote economic mobility 
– we often should vary the subsidy by income.  For example, if a subsidy’s goal is to provide 
private benefits (e.g., EITC), it usually should favor low-income claimants.  In contrast, a 
subsidy that seeks to generate positive externalities for low-income people (e.g., charity for soup 
kitchens) should focus on high-income claimants if they are more responsive.  Ultimately, when 
we decide whether the marginal reimbursement rate of a tax expenditure should vary with 
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 As a result, this five cent error for all minimizes the square of deviations (and thus deadweight loss) at twenty-
five.  (The deadweight loss is the square of the errors, or 1/2(5*5) +1/2(5*5) =25.)  By contrast, if we give the full 
subsidy to one group, we have a 50% chance of being right and a 50% chance of an error of ten, which generates 
twice as much deadweight loss (i.e., 50).  (Deadweight loss = ½ (10*10) + ½ (0*0) = 50.)  See Batchelder, Goldberg 
& Orszag, supra note 8, at 48 (“Although the expected error would be the same irrespective of whether the entire 
subsidy was given to one group or spread evenly over both groups, the expected deadweight loss would be 
minimized by a uniform subsidy because the loss from failing to correct for a positive externality rises with the 
square of the uncorrected externality.”). 
178
 Expected error is 3.75, based on the following: ¼(5) +1/4(5) +1/4(2.5) +.1/4(2.5)=3.75.  (Note that this analysis 
deems both overpayment and underpayment to be an error.) 
179
 Expected deadweight loss is 15.625: 1/2(5*5) + 1/2(2.5*2.5) =15.625. 
180
 Expected error falls to 2.5: 1/2(2.5) +1/2(2.5) =2.5.  Expected deadweight loss falls to 6.25: ½(2.5)*(2.5) 
+1/2(2.5)(2.5) = 6.25.  
181
 Cf. Kaplow, Standard Deduction, supra note 117, at 14 n. 38 (“It is a familiar statistical property that the mean 
minimizes the sum of the squares of deviations.”). 
182
 Another potential problem with subsidies that vary by income is that they promote clientele effects.  Those who 
receive more generous subsidies might outbid others who otherwise value the asset more.  Shaviro, Bucket & 
Buffett, supra note 20, at 8.  Yet such bidding seems more plausible for some assets (e.g., municipal bonds) than 
others (e.g., houses).   After all, a bidding war for a house between taxpayers in the 20% and 40% bracket seems 
improbable.  If it happens, the difference in income is likely to overwhelm any differences in tax treatment.  Even 
so, clientele effects can distort the allocation of at least some assets.   
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income, we need to account for all the issues in this Article’s framework.  The point here is 
merely that we need a context-specific analysis, instead of assuming uniformity is the answer.   
 
V. Conclusion 
 To sum up, then, this Article offers a three-part framework for deciding whether to repeal 
or limit a tax expenditure.  First, what programmatic benefits would we lose?  What positive 
externalities are created, and how much would we have without the subsidy?  Can we tighten up 
the tax expenditure to get all (or most) of the benefits at a lower cost?  Second, do we incur an 
offsetting welfare cost by increasing excess burden?  What are the effects on labor and savings 
decisions, administrative costs, and planning?  Third, do we incur an offsetting cost in 
distribution?  Who is claiming the tax benefit?  What is the economic incidence of this benefit?   
 This Article shows that repeal or a limit can sometimes enhance all of our goals. These 
“grand slam” opportunities can arise, for instance, when we can repeal a tax expenditure that 
offers only meager programmatic benefits, and also when we cap a tax expenditure whose 
marginal programmatic benefits decline significantly as an individual engages in more of the 
favored activity. 
 In other settings, the elements of this Article’s framework are often in tension with each 
other.  Steps to preserve programmatic incentives, for example, might increase excess burden or 
undercut distributional goals (or both).  This Article also shows that various limits balance these 
tradeoffs in different ways.  Income-based caps have essentially the opposite effects as income-
based floors, while maximum fractions are a compromise between the two.  We should choose 
the tradeoff that yields the most favorable balance of benefits and costs in a particular context.  
 Given these nuances, it is important to tailor limits to the context.  This is less feasible for 
limits that apply to baskets, instead of expenditure-specific limits. For similar reasons, this 
Article counsels against tax expenditures that are uniform at all income levels, since externalities 
and elasticity are likely to vary with income.   
 The bottom line, then, is that limits need to be fine-tuned to account for externalities, 
elasticity, administrative costs, labor and savings decisions, planning and distribution.  
Admittedly, the relevant facts will not always be known, at least with certainty.  We will have to 
make the best judgments we can with limited information.  Although the results will not be 
perfect, we should be able to improve on current law. 
 A key question, of course, is whether we have the political will to repeal or limit tax 
expenditures that are not cost-justified.  These tax expenditures are jealously guarded by interest 
groups, who will resist repeal or limits in predictable ways.  In ordinary fiscal conditions, their 
higher stakes would give them a formidable political edge.  But these are somewhat unusual 
times.  Our soaring national debt and anemic economic growth, sobering as they are, may offer 
an opportunity.  These challenges can focus popular attention on what otherwise would be 
obscure debates.  This higher profile is crucial in repealing or limiting a tax expenditure that is 
not cost-justified.  Voters who have no direct stake in it must become a political counterweight to 
those who do.  These seemingly unaffected voters must come to recognize that the alternatives to 
repealing or limiting someone else’s sacred cow – such as marginal rate increases, spending cuts, 
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or more deficit spending – will, in fact, burden them.  This insight could motivate the uninvolved 
to become involved.  While it is too optimistic to consider this outcome inevitable, it is too 
pessimistic to rule it out.  If it happens, we should not let the opportunity go to waste.  
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Appendix
183
  
Tax Expenditure      FY 2014 Cost (Billions) 
Business Investments 
 Dividends and Long-Term Capital Gains     96.5
184
 
Domestic Production Expenses      16.8
185
 
Expensing Depreciable Business Property (Sec. 179)   7.0
186
 
Research Activities Credit (Sec. 41)       5.5187 
Research and Experimental Expenditures Deduction   4.7
188
 
Charity 
 Charitable Contributions Other than for Education and Health Care  35.8
189
 
 Charitable Contributions for Education     6.3
190
 
 Charitable Contributions for Health Care     4.8
191
 
Education 
 Employer-Provided Education Assistance and Tuition Reduction  1.5
192
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 In general, these estimates come from Jt. Com. on Tax’n, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 
2014–18 (2014) (Table 1)  (hereinafter  “Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates”) (offering tax expenditure 
estimates by budget function).  In some cases, the number represents the sum of both the corporate and personal 
income tax revenue.  
184
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 27. 
185
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 27 ($12.2 billion for corporations plus $4.6 billion for 
individuals). 
186
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 26 ($2.5 billion for corporations plus $4.5 billion for 
individuals). 
187
 Jt. Com. on Tax’n, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2012–17, at 30 (2013) ($5.4 billion 
for corporations and $.1 billion for individuals estimated for 2014).  Since this credit expired on December 31, 2014, 
the Joint Committee did not include it in its 2014 estimate.   Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 10.  
But it has expired before and been extended, and many expect it to be offered again in 2014.  Committee for a 
Responsible Federal Budget, Ways and Means Considers Extending Business Tax Breaks, Apr. 28, 2014, 
http://crfb.org/blogs/ways-means-considers-extending-business-tax-breaks.  
188
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 23 ($4.6 billion for corporations plus $.1 billion for 
individuals). 
189
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 31 ($1.0 billion for corporations plus $34.8 billion for 
individuals). 
190
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 29 ($.3 billion for corporations plus $6.0 billion for 
individuals). 
191
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 31 ($1.8 billion for corporations plus $3.0 billion for 
individuals). 
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 Parental Personal Exemption for Students Aged 19-23   4.7
193
 
Post-Secondary Education Tuition Credit     23.0
194
 
Savings Exclusions and Coverdell       .1
195
 
 Scholarship and Fellowship Income Exclusion    2.6
196
 
 Student Loan Interest         1.7
197
 
Employment 
 Cafeteria Plan Benefits       34.5
198
 
 Miscellaneous Fringe Benefits      7.3
199
 
 Meals and Lodging        2.0
200
 
Green Energy 
Energy Credit and Renewable Electricity Production   1.8
201
 
Energy Efficient Improvements to Residential Property   1.8
202
 
Plug-in Hybrids        0.2
203
 
Health Care 
Employer-provided Health Insurance Exclusion    143
204
 
Health Savings Accounts       1.6
205
 
Medical Expenses and Long-Term Care Deduction    9.9
206
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
192
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 29. ($1.2 billion for employer-provided education assistance  
and $.3 billion for tuition reductions). 
193
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 29. 
194
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 30. 
195
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 29. 
196
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 29. 
197
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 29.  
198
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 30. 
199
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 30. 
200
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 30. 
201
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 23 ($.5 billion for corporations and $.1 billion for individuals 
for energy credit; $1.1 billion for corporations and $.1 billion for renewable energy production).  
202
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 23 ($.6 billion for existing residential properties, $1.1 for 
energy-efficient property credit and $.1 billion for advanced-energy property credit). 
203
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 23. 
204
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 31. 
205
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 31. 
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Medicare Benefits Exclusion       61
207
 
Self-Employed Deduction       5.4
208
 
Worker’s Compensation       4.8209 
Small Business Credit        0.9
210
 
Health Exchange Subsidies       15.5
211
 
Housing 
Low-Income Housing        7.1
212
 
Home Mortgage Interest       67.8
213
 
Exclusion of Capital Gains on Principal Residence    24.1
214
 
Property Taxes        31.9
215
 
Retirement Savings 
 IRA’s          17.9216 
Pension Contributions Exclusion      76.7
217
 
Social Security and Railroad Benefits Exclusion    37.4
218
 
Social Services and Income Support 
Child Credit         57.3
219
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
206
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 31. 
207
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 32. ($31.8 billion for hospital insurance, $22.7 billion for 
supplementary medical insurance and $6.5 billion for prescription drug insurance). 
208
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 31. 
209
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 31. 
210
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 31 ($.1 billion for corporations and $.8 billion for 
individuals). 
211
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 31. 
212
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 26 ($6.8 billion for corporations and $.3 billion for 
individuals). 
213
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 25. 
214
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 26. 
215
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 25. 
216
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 32. ($11.8 billion for traditional IRAs and $4.9 billion for 
Roth IRAs and $1.2 billion for elective deferrals). 
217
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 32. ($5.8 billion for Keogh plans, $26 billion for defined 
benefit plans, and $44.9 billion for defined contribution plans). 
218
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 33.  
219
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 30. 
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Child and Dependent Care       4.6
220
 
Disability and Public Assistance Benefits Exclusion    3.4
221
 
EITC          69.2
222
 
State and Local Governments 
 Municipal Bond Interest Exclusion (General Bonds)    33.1
223
 
 State and Local (Nonbusiness) Income Taxes    56.5
224
 
Transportation 
Employer-Paid Transportation Benefits     4.9
225
 
 
 
                                                          
220
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 30. 
221
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 32. 
222
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 32. 
223
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 33. 
224
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 33. 
225
 Jt. Com. 2014 Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra, at 28. 
